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EXPATRIATION - ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING
Daniel Klubock*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the problems presented by the expatriation statutes' are of
profound constitutional significance, the Supreme Court has considered them
directly in only four cases.2 Future Court sessions will face a compelling need
for incisive analysis.'
A great deal of confusion has arisen in the attempt to determine the
constitutional bases for these statutes. The confusion has been caused by a
failure to distinguish among the variety of purposes served by the statutes, to
recognize and consider the effects of the changing historical contexts from
which the present statutes arose, and to define expatriation accordingly. The
purpose of this article is to examine a proposed definition of expatriation, that
* Member of the Massachusetts Bar. A.B., Bard, 1956; LL.B., Harvard, 1962.
1 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481, 1482 and 1484 are set out in Appendix I. Throughout this paper
the words citizen and national, and citizenship and nationality, will be used interchangeably.
Similarly, denationalization will be treated as identical to loss of citizenship. The distinction
made between nationals and citizens in 8 U.S.C. § 1408 is disregarded.
2, In order of decision, Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915); Savorgnan v. United
States, 338 U.S. 491 (1950); Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958); Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86 (1958). See also Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962); Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356
U.S.,1129 (1958); Gonzales v. Landon, 350 U.S. 920 (1955); Kawakita v. United States,
343 U.S. 717 (1952); Kurtz v. Moffit, 115 U.S. 487 (1885).
3 In the October 1962 Term, the Court will hear Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 238 F.2d
239 (9th Cir. 1956), remanded, 362 U.S. 384, 192 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Cal. 1960), restored to
calendar for reargument, 369 U.S. 832 (1962) (No. 19, 1961 Term; renumbered No. 2, 1962
Term) and Rusk v. Cort, 187 F. Supp. 683 (D.D.C. 1960), set for reargument, 369 U.S. 367
(1962) (No. 20, 1961 Term; renumbered No. 3, 1962 Term. In addition, certiorari has been
granted in Schneider v. Rusk, No. 15,959 D.C. Cir., May 11, 1962, cert. granted, 31 U.S.L.
WEEK 3125 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1962) (No. 251, 1962 Term). United States ex rel. Marks v. Esper-
dy, 203 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), will probably reach the.Court before long. The Cort
and Menrdoza-Martinez cases challenge the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (10). The
Schneider case challenges 8 U.S.C. § 1484 (a) (1). The Marks case challenges 8 U.S.C. § 1481
(a) (3).
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is derived historically, for its theoretical consistency and its amenability to
practical application.4
There are five possible purposes that can be served by the expatriation
statutes: they can permit a citizen to exercise the right to change his nationality;
they can prevent international friction; they can rid the country of undesirable
persons; they can regulate the political franchise; and they can punish citizens
who engage in prohibited activity.
Expatriation has had four major definitions: loss of nationality, or aliena-
tion; denial of diplomatic protection; disfranchisement; and banishment. It
is the purpose of this article to show that in construing the expatriation statutes,
the sanction contained in each of these definitions of expatriation should be
applied according to the purpose of the statute. When the, right to transfer na-
tionality is concerned, alienation is appropriate. When the purpose is to eliminate
international friction, it is appropriate to withhold diplomatic protection. When
the integrity of the political franchise is threatened, the remedy should be dis-
franchisement. When the purpose of expatriation is to rid the country of
undesirable citizens, or to punish citizens, it can only be called banishment.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT
A. HISTORICAL. BACKGROUND
Until the American Revolution, expatriation was unknown to the English
common law.' The Declaration of Independence then proclaimed the right of
citizens to break all ties of allegiance to the sovereign.' This doctrine, of course,
conflicted with the English notion of perpetual allegiance, and England fought
to retain its sovereignty over the colonies. As a result of its defeat, England
was forced to modify its position, and, in 1824, an English court continued
the evolution of the common law concept of allegiance by declaring that one
could expatriate himself with the concurrence of the sovereign, and that the
Peace Treaty of 1783 had given the sovereign's consent to the expatriation of
the colonists.'
In the first part of the nineteenth century, the American courts had little
opportunity to deal with the problem. When they did, they were faced with
the fact that in the absence of legislation, the only direction available to guide
their decisions was that of the common law principle of perpetual allegiance.
4 Some fundamental questions of a theoretical nature will not be considered in this article.
Concepts of the nature and inherent powers of sovereignty and of sovereignty as derived from
the consent of the governed will not be discussed. See Boudin, Involuntary Loss of American
Nationality, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1510 (1960). For a comprehensive treatment of the nature of
sovereignty in connection with a passport denial, see Judge Bazelon's dissenting opinion in
Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd sub nom. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116 (1958).
Further, neither the problems of international order presented by the stateless person and
the deportation and exclusion of the "undesirable" person, nor the problems of the stateless
person himself will be considered here. See the references collected in Comment, The Ex-
patriation Act of 1954, 64 YALF L.J. 1164, 1189 n. 84 (1955); Maxey, Loss of Nationality:
Individual Choice or Government Fiat?, 26 ALBANY L. REV. 151 (1962).
5 See Story's Case, 3 Dyer's Reports, §§ 298b, 300b (1571); Calvin's Case, 7 Coke 1
(1608); TsrANG, EXPATRIATION IN AMERICA PRIOR TO 1907 (1942).
6 The theory developed'that the sovereign had an obligation to protect his subjects, and
that when he did not, he no longer had the right to subject. This, of course, was -far from
a personal right.
7 Doe d. Thomas v. Acklam, 2 Barn. and Cr. 779, 107 Eng. Rep. 572 (K.B. 1824).
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In no Supreme Court case was it held that a citizen had expatriated himself
except by exercising the choice offered under the Peace Treaty of 1783.'
Urged by the Court to provide more liberal legislative direction, Congress
debated the question frequently. However, no proposals could gain acceptance
due to the opposition of those who believed that any federal legislation con-
stituted a threat to the individual's right to expatriate himself. It was thought
by many that federal citizenship depended on state citizenship, and that, there-
fore, the states should bethe only sovereign entities to define the means by which
a citizen could effect his expatriation.9 Besides, the pressure for legislation was
light since there were few instances in which Americans desired to expatriate
themselves. The Court was faced with the problem only when a prosecution
for the violation of a neutrality proclamation was challenged,' 0 or when property
rights were at issue.1 It is only in the latter cases that one might find precedent
for involuntary expatriation where expatriation meant literally the loss of Ameri-
can citizenship. However, in each of these cases it was clear that the claii
to United States citizenship was but an afterthought following a voluntary
and intentional exercise of the option provided by the Treaty of 1783.2
The major problem in the nineteenth century was that of securing the
rights of naturalized. Americans who sought to sever all ties of allegiance to
their native countries. This problem, which was one of those leading to the
War of 1812, was a constant source of difficulty for the Government. It was-
the policy of the Executive to protect naturalized citizens abroad as it would
protect native Americans, with the exception of naturalized citizens who returned'
to their native countries. This exception was probably due more to the fact
that the United States was not strong enough to challenge effectively another
country's law of perpetual allegiance, -than to a theoretical position. As the
United States grew stronger, and the vote of the increasing numbers of immi-
grants grew more influential, the United States took a more forceful position.
In 1859, under the leadership of President Buchanan, the principle of protecting
all citizens equally was asserted.13 It has been suggested that this policy was
adopted not only "to keep pace with the growing interest in the protection of
American citizens abroad," or to appeal to the large vote of naturalized citizens,
8 Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99 (1830); Shanks v.
Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 241 (1830). But see Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64 (1804), in which it was held that an American citizen could expatriate himself
for certain commercial purposes. See also Juando v. Taylor, 13 Fed. Cas. 1179 (No. 7558)
(D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1818).
9 See, e.g., the expatriation act of Virginia, written by Thomas Jefferson, adopted in
1779. Hening, The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia from
the First Session of the Legislature in the Year 1619, 129 (1819-1823). The statute was
also adopted in Kentucky when it became a state. The acts were amended in Virginia in
1819 and Kentucky in 1851 to provide that one could not expatriate himself by naturaliza-
tion in a country with which the United States was at war. See Tsiang, op. cit. supra note
4, at 26-27. The Supreme Court, in Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 131 (1795), ruled
that the Virginia act could not operate to affect United States citizenship.
10 Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 131 (1795); Henfield's Case, 11 Fed. Cas. 1099
(No. 6360) (C.C.D.Pa. 1793).
11 E.g., Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242 (1830); Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's
Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99 (1830); The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.)
283 (1822); McIlvaine v. Coxe's Lessee; 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 209 (1808); Murray v.'The
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
12 See cases cited note 8 supra.
13 See Tsi-NG, op. cit. supra note 5, at 71-82.
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but also because Buchanan "believed ... that the way to avert a civil war
was to unite North and South by a common foreign policy of a nature to arouse
national feeling."' 4
During the Civil War, this policy was not enforced for two reasons:
1) the Government did not want to incur the hostility of a nation that might,
as a result, aid the Confederate States; and 2) the fact that "when conscription
was made necessary... by the continuation of the War, the ... Government
actually found... [that] there were many naturalized Americans calling upon
the United States for protection from conscription in their native lands when
they had just returned to the country of origin for the purpose of evading the
American draft."' 5 This situation prompted President Lincoln to suggest that
"it might be advisable to fix a limit beyond which no citizen of the United
States residing abroad may claim the protection of his Government."'"
It was in this context, as well as that of a large number of desertions, that
Congress passed the Act of 1865, which included a provision:
That, in addition to the other lawful penalties of the crime of
desertion . . . , all [deserters] . . . shall be deemed and taken to
have voluntarily relinquished and forfeited their rights of citizenship
and their rights to become citizens; and . . . shall be forever
incapable of holding any office of trust or profit under the United
States, or of exercising any rights of citizens thereof; and all persons
who ... shall depart the jurisdiction of the district in which he is
[sic] enrolled, or go beyond the limits of the United States, with
intent to avoid any draft into the military or naval service, duly
ordered, shall be liable to the penalties of this section."
It was this Act from which sections (a) (8) and (a) (10) of 8 U.S.C. § 1481
were drawn.'
Whether the Act declared that citizens lost their citizenship or only their
rights of citizenship has been an issue under a great deal of debate. 9 The
Government has contended that the proper interpretation is that it was citizen-
ship itself that was lost. It has based its argument on three grounds: 1) that
the words "shall be deemed and taken to have voluntarily relinquished and
forfeited" are words appropriate to the meaning of expatriation as it was then
conceived- as a voluntary act; 2) that the Act was explicit about the fact
that aliens would be denied the right to become citizens; and 3) that it was
later interpreted as imposing loss of citizenship.2" The Government explains
the stress in the debates on the bills that served as models for this Act on the
14 Id. at 82.
15 Id. at 83.
16 Annual Message of Dec. 8, 1863, 7 Messages and Papers of the President 3381-3382,
quoted in TSIANG, op. cit. supra note 5, at 83-84.
17 Act of March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 487, § 21.
18 See Appendix I. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94 (1958); Brief for Appellant,
p. 34, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, No. 2, 1962 Term.
19 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 108-109 (Brennan, J., concurring), 116-117 n. 2 (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting); Brief for Petitioner, p. 34 n. 11, Brief for Respondent, pp. 41-44,
Supplemental Brief for the Respondents on Reargument, pp. 11-17, Perez v. Brownell, 356
U.S. 44 (1958); Brief of American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae, pp. 10-15,
Mackey v. Mendoza-Martinez, 362 U.S. 384 (1960); Brief for Appellant, pp. 65-71, Ken-
nedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, No. 2, 1962 Term; Roche, The Loss of Amencan Nationality,
99 U. PA. L. Rav. 25-26, 61-62 (1950).
20 Brief for the Appellant, pp. 65-71, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, No. 2, 1962 Term.
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loss of rights - particularly the loss of the political franchise - as the primary
consequence, by pointing out that in 1865 disfranchisement "was the major
consequence of the loss of citizenship; this country had virtually no laws barring
aliens, who were as free to come and go as were citizens, and no laws providing
for aliens' deportation; the great difference between citizens and aliens was in
the right to vote and to hold office."'"
Perhaps a more reasonable interpretation of the statute would be that it
means what it appears to mean-that aliens would lose their right to become
citizens, and that citizens would lose the rights of federal citizenship. Good
reason can be found for the distinction. The Constitution expressly gave
Congress the power to limit naturalization.22 It did not give Congress the
power to take citizenship away.23 At the same time, it was well established
that a felon could be disfranchised. 24
In addition, disfranchisement was not the only right denied the alien.
One of the most important rights of citizenship was the right to the diplomatic
protection of the United States. It appears from the context of the problem referred
to by President Lincoln in his message to Congress, that the Act was designed
to relieve the United States of the obligation to extend its protection to its
citizens who had fled to foreign countries to escape service in the armed forces
of the United States.2" This interpretation would give some meaning to the
fact that the Act was phrased in terms of the voluntary forfeiture of rights.
The citizen being outside the jurisdiction of our courts, there could be no
adjudication of his guilt. The Constitution forbade the denial of rights without
due process of law,26 but it was not unreasonable to presume that one who
remained outside the jurisdiction of the United States .against its laws was
willing to forfeit his right to its protection. Since the denial would not operate
until sixty days after the law was proclaimed, the citizen actually could choose
between remaining abroad without protection or returning to serve in the
armed forces."
This interpretation would explain why the provision was divided as it
was. The offenders (1) "shall be deemed and taken to have voluntarily relin-
quished and forfeited their rights of citizenship ... and [2] such deserters shall
be forever incapable of holding any office of trust or profit under the United
States, or of exercising any rights of citizens thereof...." The second clause
imposes disfranchisement. It does not rely, as does the first clause, on
the presumption of voluntary forfeiture of rights. The first clause covers
diplomatic protection. If read as "loss of citizenship," it would make the second
redundant. The second clause refers to positive rights. Probably the right to
21 Id. at 69.
22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
23' "The power of naturalization, vested in Congress by the Constitution, is a power to con-
fer citizenship, not a power to take it away." United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S.
649, 703 (1898).
24 See, e.g., Barker v. People, 20 Johns. R. 457 (N.Y. 1823).
25 Note 16 supra.
26 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
27 This may have been something of a Hobson's choice - serving in the forces of the
United States or of the native country. In addition, it did not account for those abroad
under duress.
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vote was not specified because, with the exception of elections held in the
Territories,28 the right to vote was controlled by the states."9 The first clause
implies the loss of passive rights-the rights owed the citizen by the Govern-
ment.
A further argument that militates for the conclusion that the Act was
not designed to deprive a citizen of his citizenship itself is that from the very
beginning of the debate over the right to expatriation it was maintained that
an unlawful act could never effect a citizen's expatriation. Hamilton, arguing
against a bill introduced in the legislature of New York in 1784 that would
have expatriated those who had supported the British in the Revolution, ex-
pressed his fears that such a bill would nullify the laws passed to punish traitors:
"The idea, indeed, of citizens transforming themselves into aliens, by taking
part against the State to which they belong, is altogether of new invention,
unknown and inadmissible in law, and contrary to the nature of the social
compact."3" Jefferson, the foremost proponent of the right of expatriation, wrote
that laws regulating expatriation "would never prescribe an illegal act among
the legal modes by which a citizen might disfranchise himself; nor render treason,
for instance, innocent by giving it force of a dissolution of the obligation of
the criminal to his country."'"
The courts that interpreted the Act of 1865 demonstrated the confusion
over the meaning of the provision. They were state courts, and for the most
part were called upon to determine whether a citizen of their state had lost
his right to vote under the Act.32 Since the states controlled the right to vote, the
federal government could not disfranchise a citizen unless it took away his citizen-
ship. Therefore, the loss of the right to vote imposed by the federal government,
was equated with the loss of citizenship. Of course, this rationale was valid only
in those states that required United States citizenship as a condition for the
exercise of the vote. Twenty-two states have in the past permitted aliens to
vote, and it was not until 1928 that no aliens could vote in the presidential
election." Typical of the decisions is Huber v. Reily,'4 where it was stated that,
"as a penalty for crime against the General Government, Congress may impose
upon the criminal forfeiture of his citizenship of the United States. Disfranchise-
ment of a citizen as a punishment for crime is no unusual punishment .... "
It is significant that no case actually held that the alleged deserter had
lost any rights. In keeping with the notion that the statute prescribed the dis-
franchisement often attendant on conviction of a felony, each court held that
before any rights could be lost, the citizen must be adjudged guilty in a proper
criminal trial before a court-martial. This position was later approved by the
28 See Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885).
29 See, e.g., Huber v. Reily, 53 Pa. 112 (1866).
30 Letters from Phocion, 4 WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 256 (Constitutional ed.
1904).
31 Letter from Jefferson to Morris, Aug. 16, 1793, 4 THE WRITIwS OF THOMAS JEF-
FERSON 37-38 (Washington ed. 1859).
32 State v. Symonds, 57 Me. 148 (1869); Severance v. Healey, 50 N.H. 448 (1870);
Green v. Shumway 39 N.Y. 418 (1868); McCafferty v. Guyer, 59 Pa. 109 (1868); Huber
v. Reily, 53 Pa. 112 (1866). Holt v. Holt, 59 Me. 464 (1871), dealt with the right to sue.
33 Aylsworth, The Passing of Alien Suffrage, 25 Am. POL. SO. REv. 114 (1931).
34 53 Pa. 112, 116 (1866).
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Supreme Court in Kurtz v. Moffit,3" and is consistent with the interpretation
of the statute proposed here.
The confusion of the meaning of expatriation was compounded when
the Act of 1868,"' proclaiming the right of expatriation, was passed. This Act
was directed at other countries, and served notice that the United States would
extend its protection to all citizens, naturalized as well as native-born. There
was no question that expatriation here meant the transfer of citizenship
from a foreign country to the United States." Yet the Act proclaimed that
"this Government has freely received emigrants from all nations, and invested
them with the rights of citizenship...
All provisions of the original bill that would have relieved the United
States from the duty of providing certain citizens with diplomatic protection
were stricken before the bill was enacted into law." This problem still plagued
the Executive, and it continually requested that Congress legislate means by which
a citizen could effect his own expatriation from the United States. Until 1906, no
legislation was forthcoming, and the executive and judicial bodies were left
to their own inadequate devices. Foreign military service, positions in foreign
governments, voting in foreign elections, foreign residence, and taking oaths
of allegiance to other governments were not considered expatriating unless
they required renunciation of American citizenship. 9 Nonetheless, the Execu-
tive practice was to withhold diplomatic protection in many of these circum-
stances.40
The major force that has militated for expatriation against the will of
the citizen has been the State Department, which has always felt that it was
not theoretically consistent to withhold diplomatic protection from a citizen.4'
It is difficult to understand just what this means. 2 Certainly withholding
protection is no more inconsistent with citizenship than is disfranchisement.
This theoretical position had its origin in the principle that all citizens
should be treated equally, whether they were naturalized or native-born. The State
Department has not recognized that it is consistent to hold that citizens may
not be treated differently because of origin, but may be treated differently
because of their actions. The Act of 1868 declared that "All naturalized
35 115 U.S. 487 (1885).
36 Act of July 27, 1868, Rlv. STAT. §§ 1999, 2000, 2001 (1875) (latter two sections
now 22 U.S.C. §§ 1731, 1732 (1958)).
37 See CONG. GLOnE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. passim (1868).
38 It is important to note that this bill would not have expatriated those citizens. It
would merely have withheld diplomatic protection from them. "Such citizen would merely
not be entitled to the interposition of the Government on his behalf." CONG. GLOEE, 40th
Cong., 2d Sess. 783 (1868).
39 TSiANG, op. cit. supra note 5, at 101-03, and nn. 29-38.'
40 TsrANG, Op. cit. supra note 5, at 51, 71-72, 75-79, 95-96, 98, 103, 108; Roche, The
Loss of American Nationality, 99 U. PA. L. Rav. 25, 40, 43 (1950); BORCHARD, DIPLOMATIC
PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD §§ 315-80.
41 Letter of June 1, 1938, from Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, Homer Cummings,
Attorney General, and Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor, to the President, transmitting
proposals for what became the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1137. Hearings on H.R.6127, Superseded by H.R. 9980, Before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturali-
zation, 76th Cong. 1st Sess. 407-10 (1940).
42 See 10 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 382, 408 (1862): "Those who most indulge in the assumption
that to constitute a citizen at all, the person must have all the privileges and immunities
which any citizen can enjoy, rarely venture to specify precisely what they mean."
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citizens of the United States, while in foreign countries, are entitled to and
shall receive from this Government the same protection of persons and property
which is accorded to native-born citizens."4 This is not to say that no citizen
may be denied protection in appropriate circumstances. Despite its theoretical
position, the State Department has been consistent in practice in denying
protection to certain citizens.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, four separate concepts of ex-
patriation had developed: that of disfranchisement imposed on the felon; that
of denial of diplomatic protection to those who incurred obligations to a foreign
country or whose residence in the foreign country was itself disapproved; that
of the right of a citizen to sever his ties with his native land in order to take
on a new citizenship; and that of the merging of the wife's legal person with
her husband's.4 4 The Act of 1906' was designed to further the aims of the
second. It declared that those naturalized citizens who had returned to their
native lands to take up permanent residence within five years after naturaliza-
tion in the United States were prima facie presumed to have acquired their
naturalization fraudulently. The concept of denaturalization is quite distinct
from that of expatriation. Denaturalization is based on the theory that one
never actually was a citizen; that the alien had been treated as a citizen because
of his fraudulent misrepresentations, but that his naturalization was void ab
initio." Thus, the Act of 1906 provides no theoretical precedent for imposition
of involuntary loss of citizenship.
Executive agitation for legislation to detail methods by which a citizen
could effect his expatriation from the United States resulted in the Act of 1907. a
This Act provided that a citizen could expatriate himself by becoming natural-
ized in or taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign country. It limited this
grant of freedom to expatriate oneself by forbidding such expatriation in war-
time, in order to prevent the abuses feared by Hamilton and Jefferson. In
addition, the Act codified the common law notion that a woman who married
an alien took on her husband's nationality, and it provided a means for such
a woman to resume her American citizenship when the marriage terminated.
Section 2 of the Act declared that:
When any naturalized citizen shall have resided for two years in
the foreign state from which he came, or for five years in any other
foreign state it shall be presumed that he has ceased to be an Ameri-
can citizen .... 48
This provision was designed to permit the State Department to withhold diplo-
matic protection from naturalized citizens who resided abroad, but who could
not be denaturalized under the Act of 1906 since their residence abroad occurred
so long after naturalization that they could not be presumed under that Act
to have acquired their citizenship fraudulently. 9 Essentially it provided natural-
ized citizens with a means to expatriate themselves if that was their desire.
43 REv. STAT. § 2000 (1875) (now 22 U.S.C. § 1731 (1958)).
44 See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 69 n. 20 (Warren C.J. dissenting) (1958).
45 Act of June 29, 1906, §15, 34 Stat. 601 (now 8 U.S.C. 1451(d) (1958)).
46 See note 135 infra.
47 Act of March 2, 1907, 34 Stat. 1228.
48 Ibid.
49 41 CoNc. Rxc., Part 2, 1464-66 (1907).
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If they did not intend to give up their citizenship, they could rebut the pre-
sumption easily, either by returning to the United States,50 or by declaring
allegiance to the United States while still abroad.51 Certainly the provision
did not deprive a naturalized citizen of his citizenship against his will.5"
B. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The first significant Supreme Court decision with which we are concerned
was Mackenzie v. Hare,3 in 1915. Mrs. Mackenzie, a native American, had
married a citizen of Great Britain in 1909. She had continuously lived in the
United States with him. When she applied for registration as a voter in 1913,
her application was refused on the ground that she was no longer an American
citizen-that she had lost her citizenship in accordance with theAct of 1907.
The Court affirmed the denial of her petition for mandamus. The opinion is
difficult to assess, and it has been interpreted in more than one way.54 The
holding can be said to be that the Government may take away one's citizenship
against his will to avoid international embarrassment, and to achieve certain
domestic purposes. However, the language of the opinion contains important
qualifications.
First, this is a status that is distinct from total loss of citizenship. It is
temporary. The Court said that as long as her marriage lasts "it is made
tantamount to expatriation" and that her act "is as voluntary and distinctive
as expatriation."55 Second, the Court's concept of "voluntary" is ambiguous.
The Court said that "it may be conceded that a change of citizenship cannot
be arbitrarily imposed, that is, imposed without the concurrence of the citizen.
The law in controversy does not have that feature. It deals with a condition
voluntarily entered into, with notice of the consequences."56 This language makes
no sense. The Court characterized her expatriation voluntary because her
marriage was voluntary, and because she was aware of the consequences attached.
Since one must always be assumed to know the legal consequences of an act,
one may call imprisonment for robbery voluntary incarceration by the same
rationale.5" Under the Court's analysis, the only expatriation that would be
involuntary would be that attached to an act performed under duress, or ex-
patriation decreed by legislation to be made conditional on something other
than an act of the citizen. Perhaps an example of the latter would be expatri-
ation of a woman who married a citizen who became an alien while she was
still married to him.
The Court's problem was that the status of women had changed so as to
give them a legal identity other than that of their husband's, while the common
law lagged behind. In this case it was the right to vote that confused the Court.
50 28 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 504 (1910).
51 In United States v. Gay, 264 U.S. 353, 358 (1924), the Court characterized the
presumption as being one that it is "easy to preclude, and easy to overcome. It is a matter
of option and intention."
52 41 Cong. Rec., Part 2, 1464-66 (1907).
53 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
54 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958). Compare the majority opinion of Justice
Frankfurter, 51-52, 61-62, with the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Warren, 69-73.
55 239 U.S. at 312.
56 239 U.S. at 311-312.
57 See note, The Expatriation Act of 1954, 64 YALE L.J. 1164, 1179 (1955).
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The common law principle of identity of husband and wife raised a problem
concerning diplomatic protection. The wife had no legal rights apart from her
husband, so that giving her protection would mean giving her husband pro-
tection from his own country. The Court ought to have interpreted the Act as
withholding diplomatic protection only. Certainly there was no reason to deprive
a woman of the vote. The right to vote being a peculiarly personal one, the
principle of identity of husband and wife was inapplicable. However, the Court,
whether right or wrong, established the principle that one could be deprived of
all of the rights of his citizenship involuntarily, if only temporarily.
With the Mackenzie case as precedent, the Court held in Savorgnan v.
United States" that one who obtained citizenship in a foreign country would
lose her American citizenship against her will under the Act of 1907 and under
it successor, section 401(a) of the Nationality Act of 1940." In 1940, Mrs.
Savorgnan had married an Italian citizen. Since he was an official in the Italian
Foreign Ministry, he had to have permission to marry her. In order to get this
permission, his bride-to-be had to apply for Italian citizenship. The District
Court found that she believed that her application was only a technical matter,
and that it would have no effect on her American citizenship."0 In 1941, she
accompanied her husband to Italy where she lived with him until 1945. On her
return to this country in 1945, she brought an action to declare her citizenship
in the United States. The District Court held that she was an American citizen
since she at no time had the intention of expatriating herself.
The Supreme Court's decision reversing this holding did not conform to
the theoretical purpose of the Act of 1907, which was to permit citizens to
expatriate themselves if they wished to do so. The legislative purpose of the
Act of 1940 was more ambiguous, however. Although it was considered an
extension of the Act of 1907, there is good evidence that the purpose of the
provision was quite different - that it was intended to prevent dual citizenship."
As in the Mackenzie case, the Court did not go so far as to admit that it was
upholding involuntary loss of citizenship. It stressed the fact that she had
"voluntarily and knowingly sought and obtained Italian citizenship." 62 Yet
the holding of the Court established the position that the United States could
call on the power to regulate foreign affairs - here exercised to prevent dual
citizenship -to impose loss of citizenship against a citizen's will. 63 Recognizing
the historical and constitutional objections to such a result, the Court attempted
to provide a framework that would make its decision sound less extreme:
[T]he acts upon which the statutes expressly condition the consent
of our Government to the expatriation of its citizens are stated
objectively. There is no suggestion in the statutory language that
58 338 U.S. 491 (1950).
59 Now 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1).
60 Savorgnan v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 109, 110-111 (D.C. Wis. 1947).
61 Hearing to Revise and Codify the Nationality Laws of the United States Before the
House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
62 338 U.S. at 502.
63 In a concurring opinion in Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 138-139 (1958), Justices
Black and Douglas expressed the opinion that if the Mackenzie and Savorgnan cases stood
for this principle, they were "inconsistent with the Constitution and cannot be regarded as
binding authority."
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the effect of the specified overt acts, when voluntarily done, is con-
ditioned upon the undisclosed intent of the person doing them."'
The absence from the provisions of the present expatriation statutes of a rule
that one who obtains foreign nationality by marriage loses her American citizen-
ship may reflect a recognition by Congress that the act of obtaining foreign na-
tionality in such a situation is not a voluntary one. That Mrs. Savorgnan's choice,
of applying for citizenship in Italy or losing a potential husband, was a form of
duress was apparently not argued,65 though it had been found that her application
for foreign citizenship did not reflect a transfer of allegiance."'
The issue of intent has bearing here for another reason. If in fact Mrs.
Savorgnan had not intended to give up her American citizenship, her application
for Italian citizenship was fraudulent, and she may never have become an
Italian citizen except through her marriage itself.6 Since expatriation was
decreed only when a citizen actually became naturalized in a foreign country,
the Court should have determined whether, under Italian law, her naturalization
was void. In these circumstances, fraudulent expatriation poses little danger to
the United States. Here, it was a fraud against Italy, not the United States.
Had Mrs. Savorgnan registered her expatriation by the methods provided by
8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(6),(7) -that is, by making a formal declaration to a
United States official - perhaps then she should not have been allowed to
claim her act was fraudulent without subjecting herself to the penalties of
perjury.
The dangers to the United States of fraudulent action such as that of
Mrs. Savorgnan consist of administrative confusion and possible international
conflict in the event that the citizen returns to the country he has defrauded
and that country takes action that is incompatible with American citizenship.
There seems to be no reason why the latter can not be avoided merely by
refusing the protection of the United States to the citizen - at least until he
has formally severed his relationship with that country in accordance with its
laws. As for the administrative problem, the most convenient practice for keep-
ing track of citizens would be that of recognizing only intentional expatriations,
and only then when official notice thereof is provided by the expatriate. There-
64 338 U.S. at 499-500. (Emphasis added.) Consent.of the government implies petition by
the citizen.
65 In dismissing Mrs. Savorgnan's argument that she acted involuntarily, the Court
summarily referred to and dismissed the duress point. 338 U.S. at 502 n. 18. The court
apparently did not consider the argument that her act was involuntary because she had
no real choice.
66 See note 60, supra.
67 See 8 U.S.C. § 1489. This point was raised in an amicus brief, Brief for Amicus
Curiae (Revedin), pp. 6-7, but was not discussed by the Court. It is essentially the converse
of Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946), where the Court held that Knauer had
fraudulently sworn allegiance to the United States, and that therefore he was not a citizen
of the United States, implying that he had not in fact renounced his German citizenship, and
was therefore still a German citizen.
68 This was the practice under the Act of 1907 in regard to residence abroad, 28 Ops.
ATT'Y GEN. 504 (1910); Camardo v. Tillinghast, 29 F.2d 527, 530 (1st Cir. 1928); and was-
the practice generally before that, see Roche, The Loss of American Nationality, 99 U. PA.
L. Rav. 25, 40, 43 (1950); Letter from Secretary of State to Minister of France (1873)
1 FoREiGN REL. U. S. 256, 259; Secretary of Navy Robeson to President Grant, (1873), 2
FOREIGN REL. U.S. 1211, 1214; TsrANG, op. cit. supra note 5, at 98, 102-103, 108. But see
Act of 1868, Rav. ST T. 2000, 2001, (now 22 U.S.C. §§ 1731, 1732), requiring the Presi-
dent to provide diplomatic protection to all citizens. These provisions have been ignored.
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fore, it appears that there is neither statutory nor rational justification for the
Government's position in the Savorgnan case that "whether petitioner's Italian
naturalization is or is not cancelable for fraud ... is a matter .. .into which
American courts have no duty or right to inquire."69 If they do not so inquire,
the effect on the individual could well be to leave him stateless.7" This was
certainly not the intent of Congress.
The element of intent in effecting expatriation was treated in a considerably
different manner in Kawakita v. United States." Kawakita was a national
of both Japan and the United States at birth. At the start of World War II,
he was in Japan. Under claim of American citizenship, he returned to the
United States after the war. When he was later tried here for treason, he
claimed that he had expatriated himself under section 401 of the Nationality Act
of 1940.72
Kawakita's major contention was that he had expatriated himself under
section 401(b) ("Taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal
declaration of allegiance to a foreign state") by registering as a citizen in the
Koseki, a family census register. At the same time, he changed his registration
with the police from that of an alien to that of a citizen, and performed several
other similar acts. He faced the east each morning and paid his respects to the
Emperor. He testified that between 1943 and 1945 he felt no allegiance to the
United States.
The Court pointed out that these acts were ambiguous, and said that:
The concept of dual citizenship recognizes that a person may have
and exercise rights of nationality in two countries.... The mere fact
that he asserts the rights of one citizenship does not without more
mean that he renounces the other. In this setting petitioner's regis-
tration in the Koseki might reasonably be taken to mean no more
than an assertion of some of the rights which his dual citizenship
bestowed on him.
If what petitioner now says were his thoughts, attitudes, and motives
in 1943 and 1944 and in part of 1945, he did intend to renounce
his American citizenship. If [that] . . . were believed by the jury, the
signing of the fanily register, and the changing of his registration
at the police station and at the University would assume different
significance; those acts might then readily suggest the making of a
declaration of allegiance to Japan within the meaning of § 401 (b) .7-
Essentially what the Court has held here is that for a citizen (at least for a
citizen with dual nationality) to expatriate himself by taking an oath of alle-
giance to another country, he must intend to renounce his allegiance to the
69 Brief for Respondents, p. 45 n. 25, Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 (1950).
8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (1) calls for expatriation only upon naturalization in a foreign country,
and this, of course, depends on foreign law.
70 Mrs. Savorgnan would escape this fate since her Italian nationality is ensured by her
marriage. See U.N. COMMIssIoN ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, NATIONALITY OF MARRIED
WOmEN 49 (1954). If German law were the same as American law, Knauer would have been
stateless.
71 343 U.S. 717 (1952).
72 54 Stat. 1137, 1168.
73 343 U.S. at 723-24, 726. (Emphasis added.)
THE POWER OF EXPATRIATION
United States; and that his "thoughts, attitudes, and motives" bearing on his
intent are to be determined by the trier of fact.
To say that this opinion is difficult to reconcile with Savorgnan v. United
States would be an understatement.7 Savorgnan is cited only once and on a
different point. There are, however, two possible grounds on which to dis-
tinguish the cases: 1) Kawakita may hold that where the alleged expatriating
act is unclear, the citizen's intent will be decisive; 2) The Court may have been
attempting to fashion a different rule for dual nationals. 5
This case serves to emphasize the weakness of the expatriation statutes.
Had Kawakita originally been a citizen of only the United States, he would have
been considered expatriated; had he voted in an insignificant local election, he
would have been expatriated;76 had he been working for the Japanese Govern-
ment directly, rather than through a private employer, at the same work, he
would have been expatriated.7" There is no rational justification for such a
result. Indeed, it would be something of a delight to hear an argument that
a citizen had expatriated himself by voting in an election during war in an
enemy country after the decision of Perez v. Brownell." Yet the statute un-
equivocally declares such an act to effect loss of citizenship.
It seems to follow from the foregoing discussion that if foreign naturalization
and the taking of an oath to a foreign nation are to be considered devices through
which the Government allows one to effect his expatriation, then intent to ex-
patriate must be read into them as a required condition. If, however, the purpose
of these provisions is to eliminate the problems caused by dual nationality and
divided allegiance, they should be treated only. as permitting the State Depart-
ment to withhold diplomatic protection.
The next case before the Court was Gonzales v. Landon." The Court held
that in order to expatriate a citizen under section 401 (j) of the Nationality Act
of 1940, the Government must prove through clear, convincing and unequivocal
evidence that the citizen had remained outside the country to avoid military
service. The Government has stated that, "This standard of proof is comparable
to that applied in a criminal case ... . "80
The next cases decided by the Court were decided together in 1958.
In Nishikawa v. Dulles,"1 the Court held that the standard of proof
declared necessary in the Gonzales case also applied to the proof under 8 U.S.C.
74 For a square holding on the oath provision in a case in which the facts were nearly
identical with those in Savorgnan, see Revedin v. Acheson, 194 F.2d 482 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 820 (1952).
75 Jalbuena v. Dulles, 254 F.2d 379 (3d Cir. 1958), held that an oath of allegiance
to the Philippine Islands did not effect the expatriation of one who was a national of that
country and the United States. "[C]onduct merely declaratory of what one national aspect
of dual citizenship necessarily connotes, cannot reasonably be construed as an act of renun-
ciation of the other national aspect of the actor's duel status." Id. at 381 (citing Kawakita
v. United States). The case is criticized in Note, Expatriating the Dual National, 68 YALE
L.J. 1167 (1959).
76 Quaere whether voting is not in the same class as the oath for a dual national?
77 The Nationality Act of 1940, § 401(d), now 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (4) (A) specifies its
application to dual nationals.
78 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
79 350 U.S. 920 (1955).
80 Brief for Appellant, p. 52, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, No. 2, 1962 Term.
81 356 U.S. 129 (1958).
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§ 1481 (a) (3) that a citizen had voluntarily entered the armed forces of another
country. During World War II, Nishikawa, a national of both the United States
and Japan, had been drafted into the Japanese army. The question centered
on whether he could have avoided the draft. Since the proof never reached the
required level, the Court was not forced to reach the question of the constitu-
tionality of the provision itself.2
In Perez v. Brownell,8 the Court held that a citizen could be expatriated
against his will under 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (5) for voting in a foreign political
election. Perez was born in the United States in 1909, and lived here until he
was 10 or 11 years old. He then moved with his parents to Mexico, where he
lived until 1943. He was aware of his duty as an American citizen to register
for the draft, but failed to do so. In 1943 and 1944, he gained admission to
the United States as a Mexican citizen. In 1947 he applied for admission again,
this time as an American citizen. He was ordered excluded on the ground that
he had expatriated himself, when he admitted having remained outside of the
United States to avoid military service84 and having voted in political elections
in Mexico. In 1952 Perez again entered the United States as a Mexican citizen.
In 1953 he surrendered to immigration authorities who ordered him deported
as an alien not in possession of a valid immigration visa. In 1954 he brought
suit for a judgment declaring him to be an American citizen.
Justice Frankfurters majority opinion in the Perez case is a model of clarity.
After examining the history of the subject, he asked on what source of power
Congress drew, and answered that it was the power to regulate foreign affairs.
He then stated a fundamental conception of the nature of the legislative power:
Broad as the power in the National Government to regulate for-
eign affairs must necessarily be, it is not without limitation. The re-
strictions confining Congress in the exercise of any of the powers
expressly delegated to it in the Constitution apply with equal vigor
when that body seeks to regulate our relations with other nations.
Since Congress may not act arbitrarily, a rational nexus must exist
between the content of a specific power in Congress and the action
of Congress in carrying that power into execution. More simply
stated, the means - in this case, withdrawal of citizenship - must
be reasonably related to the end - here, regulation of foreign
affairs. The inquiry -and, in the case before us, the sole inquiry -
into which this Court must enter is whether or not Congress may
have concluded not unreasonably that there is a relevant connection
between this fundamental source of power and the ultimate legis-
lative action."
This passage tells us that the only limitation on legislative action is that Congress
must reasonably believe it was not acting arbitrarily. It is difficult to imagine
this restriction's being applied with "vigor." The test is whether Congress itself
thinks it acted arbitrarily, not whether it actually did or not. Seemingly one
82 This provision was held constitutional in United States ex rel. Marks v. Esperdy, 203
F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
83 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
84 The Court found it unnecessary to consider whether Perez could be expatriated for
draft evasion.
85 356 U.S. at 58.
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will always be able to find that Congress thought it was not acting arbitrarily.
The Court may only inquire into whether Congress' conclusion was reasonable -
or, rather, not unreasonable.
From here on in it is easy sledding:
We cannot deny to Congress the reasonable belief that [serious
embarrassments] ...might well become acute, to the point ofjeopardizing the successful conduct of international relations, when
a citizen of one country chooses to participate in the political or
governmental affairs of another country. The citizen may by his
action unwittingly promote or encourage a course of conduct con-
trary to the interests of his own government; moreover, the people
or government of the foreign country may regard his action to be
the action of his government, or at least as a reflection if not an
expression of its policy.' 6.
In addition, Justice Frankfurter brought in the fact that voting has been inter-
preted by Congress "not irrationally" as evidence of a divided allegiance."7
The last argument cannot be taken as more than an aside. Justice Frank-
furter would certainly not raise this one sentence to the dignity of a holding
without further discussion. To hold that Congress may expatriate one for having
a "less than complete and unswerving allegiance to the United States""8 would
be too important a pronouncement to be delivered without what might pass
for a reasoned elaboration. Perhaps this sentence was placed in the opinion to
avoid ignoring completely the true congressional purpose and the major argu-
ment of the Government."9
There is no doubt but that legislative history shows clearly that it was
just this question of allegiance that was the determining fact to Congress.9"
Justice Frankfurter tried to sidestep this fact, after recognizing it, by citing the
international embarrassments that were the target of the Act of 1907. This will
not do, for the problem in 1907 concerned the protection sought by citizens
abroad who owed duties to foreign governments and refused to take part in
the affairs of the foreign countries - specifically, refused to perform required
military service. Nor did the argument of the Government even mention the
kind of international embarrassments that worried Justice Frankfurter.9 In
fact, the Government relied primarily on the issue of the case that was not decided
- draft-evasion - and gave the entire area of voting in a foreign election only
86 Id. at 59.
87 Id. at 60-61.
88 Ibid.
89 The argument is also relevant to a due process analysis.
90 It seems clear that the provision concerning voting was directed specifically at those
German-Americans who had voted in the Saar elections. Hearings on H.R.6127 Before the
House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 286-87. See
356 U.S. at 54-56, 73-76.
91 Conduct by an American such as taking an oath of allegiance to an-
other country .. . or serving in its army ...or working for its govern-
ment . . .or the commission of an act of treason . . .and even voting
in a foreign political election . . . may very well lead to embroilment
or conflict between the foreign state and this country over the duties
and obligations of the American who has performed such acts. Since
the other nation has an obvious claim upon him, as does this country,
the possibility of serious controversy is ever-present.
Brief for Respondent, p. 33. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
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one paragraph in its brief,92 and one paragraph in its supplemental brief on
reargument.
93
The proposition that by voting in a foreign election, or serving in a foreign
army, one may be unwittingly promoting a course of conduct contrary to the
interests of the United States is not one on which expatriation should be based.
That argument was not suggested by the Government. Even if there were
substance to the notion that the United States may expatriate those who promote
a course of conduct contrary to the interests of the United States, it is questionable
whether the expatriation provision should be effective against those who promote
the interests of the United States. These questions are difficult ones, and it
cannot be that Justice Frankfurter would pass on them without considering
them more carefully. His argument can be taken only as rather loose dictum,
and should not be considered in any way as precedent.
Justice Frankfurter's basic rationalization is that our Government can be
embarrassed by the citizen's vote being interpireted by the foreign government
and its people as the action of the United States or a reflection of United States
policy, and that Congress, under its power to regulate foreign affairs, may
remedy this danger by providing for the alienation of such citizen. If the foreign
government permits the alien to vote, it will not feel that his voting is meddling.9'
If the ballot is a secret one, no one will be able to say that the American's vote
was an expression of American policy because the vote will not be known. Even
if the vote is open, it would seem unlikely that anyone would take the vote to
represent American policy unless American policy were already. well known,
as it was in the case of the Italian elections of 1946 and 1948. Furthermore,
section 1481 (a) (5) would apply in war, and one could not very well say that
an American voting in an enemy country would increase international friction.
Had Kawakita, for example, voted in a local Japanese election in 1942, he
would have escaped punishment for treason.95 Surely this result would not be
"not unreasonable." And, of course, there are the arguments well made by the
dissenters in Perez that there is much greater harm possible from speeches
and writings.99
In summary, Justice Frankfurter's argument is that Congress' power to
regulate foreign affairs justifies the expatriation of one voting in a foreign
political election because Congress could believe, not unreasonably, that: a) the
foreign government will be upset at American meddling despite its permitting it;
and b) in the case of an open ballot the vote will be taken to reflect official
American foreign policy when that policy is not otherwise public. The fact that
these results will be possible only in very limited circumstances, and will be
clearly impossible in the vast majority of cases, does not seem to Justice Frank-
furter to be relevant. He gave no indication that the Court would examine
each case to determine whether the possibilities were in fact present. The
92 Id. at 39. The emphasis on the evil of divided allegiance is stressed.
93 Supplemental Brief for Respondents on Reargument, p. 6, Perez v. Brownell, 356
U.s. 44 (1958).
94 This would also be true for a dual national voting in his other country.
95 But see notes 73, 75-76 supra.
96 356 U.S. at 81-82 (dissenting opinion). The Constitution protects the right to speak
and write, but voting in a foreign election is not protected activity.
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decision, however, must be taken to include all cases, including those in which
the United States has urged its citizens to vote, those of the dual citizen, and
those of the citizen voting in a country with which we are at war. The only
standard being applied with "vigor" is the standard that the Court will in no
circumstance declare legislation unconstitutional.
Chief Justice Warren, dissenting in the Perez case, maintained the position
that Congress does not have the power to take away citizenship; that Congress
can only acquiesce to the wishes of a citizen to expatriate himself, and provide
rules to regulate the exercise of the right. He explained Mackenzie v. Hare and
Savorgnan v. United States on that basis: "The precise issue posed by Section
401(e) [now 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (5)] is whether the conduct it describes in-
variably involves a dilution of undivided allegiance sufficient to show a voluntary
abandonment of citizenship."'" The Chief Justice agreed that voting could in
some instances provide evidence that there had been a transfer of allegiance,
but he felt that:
The fatal defect in the statute ... is that its application is not limited
to those situations that may rationally be said to constitute an aban-
donment of citizenship. In specifying that any act of voting in a
foreign political election results in loss of citizenship, Congress has
employed a classification so broad that it encompasses conduct that
fails to show a voluntary abandonment of American citizenship. 98
Justice Douglas, while agreeing with the Chief Justice, felt it necessary
to emphasize the dangerous implications of the decision. He pointed out that
much greater chance of international friction arises from those who advocate
certain policies, visit proscribed countries, or trade with countries under a ban.
He stated that the right to citizenship granted by the fourteenth amendment
can only be lost by waiver by a "voluntary act" which has "a sufficient relation-
ship to the relinquishment of citizenship," and that Perez's act of voting abroad
did not have the latter quality." Justice Whittaker, on the other hand,
agreed with the majority that Congress could provide for expatriation to prevent
international friction, but believed that the provision was too broad since it
covered all voting, not just that which threatened to cause such friction. More-
over, he felt that the provision was too broad since voting in a foreign election
per se "cannot reasonably be said to constitute abandonment or any division
or dilution of allegiance to the United States." 100
It would seem that there is little, if any, danger to the United
States from the possibility that those voting in foreign elections will
create international friction.1 ' There is no evidence that it has ever in fact
caused such difficulty, nor is there any basis for believing that it might cause
harm in the future. The voting provision was sustained on a rationale which
was not based on fact, legislative intent, or executive argument. It was based
97 356 U.S. at 75 (dissenting opinion).
98 Id. at 76.
99 Id. at 82-83.
100 Id. at 85.
101 The same arguments apply to 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (4), prescribing expatriation for
holding public office in a foreign country. The conflict of interest created would be a per-
sonal one, and would not tend to create international friction unless the American hid his
American citizenship, was found out, and accused of being a spy or of subverting the foreign
government under instructions of the United States.
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solely on a theoretical possibility' devised for the occasion by five Justices.
Undoubtedly the dramatic neatness of its operation was appealing: it is the
citizenship that causes the harm; cut off the citizenship and magically the harm
is gone.1"2 However, this seems to be using too large an instrument to attack
a small problem. Whatever danger might in fact exist could be deterred by
threat of criminal action.0
In Trop v. Dulles, 0 4 the Court held that section 4 01 (g) of the Nationality
Act of 194005 provided an unconstitutional punishment. During World War II,
Trop had escaped from a military stockade in Casablanca in an attempt to
rejoin his company. Within 24 hours, he was picked up as he was returning
to the stockade. He was then convicted by a court-martial of desertion, sentenced
to forfeiture of pay and allowances, imprisonment, and a dishonorable discharge.
In 1952, Trop's application for a passport was refused on the ground that he
had lost his citizenship. In 1955 he sued for a judgment declaring that he was
a citizen.
The first problem of the Court was to determine whether the purpose of
the provision was penal or remedial in nature. According to the statutory
provision, expatriation is to be imposed on a deserter only after he has been
convicted of desertion in a proper criminal proceeding. The criminal procedure
prescribed provides evidence that Congress intended the sanction of expatriation
to be penal. However, the evidence is not conclusive. A regulatory device based
on the fact of criminality is consistent with a criminal procedure. Thus, if ex-
patriation meant disfranchisement, it would not be penal.
The dissenters, in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, found that, "there is
nothing on the face of this legislation or in its history to indicate that Congress
had a [penal] . . .purpose. . . . ""' As Justice Frankfurter pointed out, section
401 (g) is a direct descendant of the Act of 1865.7 That Act, however, provided
that expatriation (loss of the rights of citizenship) was to be imposed "in addition
to the other lawful penalties of the crime of desertion from the military or naval
service." In Huber v. Reily,0 s it was held that expatriation could only follow
a criminal conviction, and that decision was referred to approvingly by the
Supreme Court in Kurtz v. Moffit. 9 It seems clear from the legislative history
that when Congress passed the Nationality Act of 1940, it adopted the holding of
Huber v. Reily, and for that reason wrote into the provision the requirement
of prior criminal conviction." If the Act is treated as imposing only disfranchise-
102 If the need to avoid friction with foreign countries is so great, could Congress not
expatriate any citizen who creates such friction? The fact that the voter was singled out for
expatriation is evidence that the question of allegiance, rather than the regulation of foreign
affairs, was the determinative one for Congress.
103 See p. 35 infra.
104 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
105 Now 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (8).
106 356 U.S. at 125.
107 13 Stat. 487. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
108 53 Pa. 112 (1866).
109 115 U.S. 487 (1885).
110 The committee report on which the Act was based stated that the Act "technically
is not a penal law," but that 401(g) was "distinctly penal in character." CoDIFIcATION OF
THE NATIONALITY LAws OF THE. UNITED STATES, 76th CONG., 1st SEss. 68 (Comm. Print
1939).
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ment, the prescribed criminal procedure would be consistent with a "nonpenal
purpose.
But the dissenters found a different nonpenal purpose:
It is not for us to deny that Congress might reasonably have believed
the morale and fighting efficiency of our troops would be impaired
if our soldiers knew that their fellows who had abandoned them
in their time of greatest need were to remain in the communion
of our citizens."'
This purpose is not in fact nonpenal. It does not provide for compensation for
the harm done by the criminal act. Nor is it a regulation of future conduct
based on the danger of irresponsible action. It represents only the policy behind
the enforcement of criminal statutes generally - that it is debilitating to the
rest of society if the criminal is not adequately punished.
C. PENDING CASES
One of the purposes of the Act of 1865 was to eliminate the friction caused
by draft evaders who fled to other countries and demanded the protection of
the United States whom those countries sought to conscript them. In the cases
of Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,"2 and Rusk v. Cort,"' the Government has
tried to justify the expatriation of draft evaders under section 401 (j) of the Na-
tionality Act of 19401. as regulation of foreign affairs. The argument of the Gov-
ernment is disingenuous. In 1865, the danger came from the intervention of the
United States to protect these "unworthy" citizens. The Government's argument
now is that danger might result from a conflict between nations when the United
States demands that the other country give the draft evader up. This is par-
ticularly dangerous, the argument continues, in the case of the dual national.
The country of refuge will have an interest in the draft evader, since he will
also be a citizen of that state, and may not want to give him up due to its
attachment to him. In the case of Mexico- the country involved in the
Mendoza case - the danger .is, pafticularly great since we have a treaty with
Mexico providing that neither country need give up such persons to the other.
Thus, the implication is that the United States might be led to attack Mexico
in violation of its treaty. Why such precipitous action? The Government's
answer is that the United States cannot wait to get its hands on the draft evader
until after the war since it must fill up its armed force."
The inadequacies are obvious: 1) even if we got the evader back, he
would probably only go to jail; 2) we would not get him back at all if we
expatriated him; 3) the danger comes not from the citizen's being in Mexico,
but from the United States' violation of international law. The District Court
111 356 U.S. at 122.
112 192 F.Supp. 1 (S.D. Cal. 1960). Now before the Supreme Court, No. 2, 1962 Term.
113 187 F.Supp. 683 (D.D.C. 1960). Now No. 3, 1962 Term.
114 54 Stat. 1168, as amended, 58 Stat. 746 (1944), now 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a)(10).
115 Brief for Appellants, pp. 11, 19-27, Mackey v. Mendoza-Martinez, 362 U.S. 384 (1960).
This argument is obviously an attempt to fit an awkward factual situation into the form sug-
gested by Justice Frankfurter - the power to regulate foreign affairs, as suggested in Perez
v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958), and the war power, as suggested in Trop v. Dules, 356
U.S. 86, 114 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
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was not swayed by the arguments of the Government and held section 401(j)
unconstitutional,116 on the authority of Trop v. Dulles.
There is ample evidence to show that the force behind the adoption of
the provision declaring expatriation for those who seek refuge from the draft
by leaving the country is the notion that they are unworthy of American citizen-
ship.11 In Mackey v. Mendoza-Martinez the Government argued, under the
rubric "The Inherent Rights of Sovereignty," that when a citizen puts him-
self physically outside American criminal jurisdiction, "he repudiates his . . .
obligation as a citizen to submit to this country's jurisdiction and authority,"
and that "such a withdrawal is so basic that all other aspects of citizenship can
rightly be made to fall with it.""'  The argument continued:
Effective jurisdiction can properly be considered as a necessary con-
comitant of citizenship. The Fourteenth Amendment itself makes it
a prerequisite to citizenship that the person be "subject to the juris-
diction" of the United States. Regardless of the crimes with which
an individual may be charged, so long as he remains within the
reach of our law enforcement agencies, within the enforceable reach
of the process of our courts, his act does not strike at the very
foundation of his relationship with his government, and with his
fellow-citizens, in so drastic a manner as does the act of one who
removes himself physically from the jurisdiction of the country
in order to elude the grasp of our law. If citizenship is a relationship
comparable to a mutual compact... , the fundamental articles of
that agreement are the submission of the citizen to the jurisdiction
of lawfully constituted government, and the agreement of the
government to proceed within the confines of the powers delegated
to it. The withdrawal of the individual from the most basic of the
elements of that agreement terminates the contract. At that point,
dissolution of his ties to the nation cannot be deemed arbitrary." 9
116 Sub nom. Mendoza-Martinez v. Rogers, 192 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
117 See pp. 4-5 supra, for the reasons behind the original passage of the provision in
the Act of 1865. The present provision, first passed in 1944, was recommended by Attorney
General Biddle. In his letter to Congress, he stated that: "Persons who are unwilling to per-
form their duty to their country and abandon it during its time of need are much less worthy
of citizenship than are persons who become expatriated on any of the existing grounds."
H. R. REP. No. 1229, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1944). Justice Brennan's treatment of sec-
tion 401 (g) in Trop v. Dulles is directly applicable:
[T]he Government argues that the necessary nexus . . . is to be found
in the idea that legislative withdrawal of citizenship is justified in this
case because Trop's desertion constituted a refusal to perform one of
the highest duties of American citizenship - the bearing of arms in a
time of desperate national peril. It cannot be denied that there is im-
plicit in this a certain rough justice. He who refuses to act as an Ameri-
can should no longer be an American - what could be fairer? But I
cannot see that this is anything other than forcing retribution from the
offender - naked vengeance. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 112 (1958)
(concurring opinion).
118 Brief for Appellants, pp. 27-28, Mackey v. Mendoza-Martinez. 362 U.S. 384 (1960).
The "Rights of Sovereignty" rubric now appears at p. 47 of the Government's brief in Ken-
nedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, No. 2, 1962 Term.
119 Id. at 29. (Footnotes omitted.) The argument could apply to all criminals (even
those who are only alleged criminals) who seek refuge abroad from prosecution. Certainly
Kawakita would have had a greater claim to expatriation if this argument were valid. If
expatriation is imposed because criminal jurisdiction is lacking, the acquiescence of the Gov-
ernment in the re-establishment of criminal jurisdiction should serve to effect repatriation.
The Court did remand- this case to the District Court for a determination of whether
the conviction for draft evasion stopped the Government from alleging expatriation. 362
U.S. 384 (1960). However, the issue was only whether the conviction was an adjudication
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If the Government's argument is not meant literally to apply to all crimes, it
will indeed be a difficult task to discover which crimes against society are crimes
against its basic structure. 20 Certainly there is authority for the view that it is
the duty of a citizen to submit himself to the jurisdiction of his country's courts. 2'
And there is no debate over whether such a citizen should be expatriated-
if expatriation means withdrawal of diplomatic protection. However, if expatria-
tion operates to exclude a citizen from the country when he is willing to return
to face prosecution, it is absurd. And it is just this result that the Government
urges in Rusk v. Cort. Cort was denied a passport to return'to the United States
from Czechoslovakia on the ground that he had remained outside the country
to avoid the draft.
Neither the .procedures prescribed, the form of the statute, nor the lan-
guage used in the statute indicates that the provision in question, now 8 U.S.C.
1481 (a) (10), was designed to impose a penalty. Historically, there was a valid
remedial purpose to so much of the Act of 1865 that pertained to those draft-
evaders who were naturalized citizens avoiding the draft by residing in their
native countries. The provision was designed to relieve the United States from
the duty of protecting them from the demands of that country. 2 But the
purposes of section 1481 (a) (10) are to deprive of their citizenship those who
are considered unworthy of it, and to deter draft-evasion-by imposing a penalty.
A sanction whose purpose is to deter is certainly a penal sanction.' It is not
clear, however, which of the purposes is the dominant one. This consideration
may be crucial since the statute does not provide for a criminal procedure.
In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez and Rusk v. Cort, the Government has
argued that section 1481 (a) (10) was a valid exercise of the war power, as
well as of the power to regulate foreign affairs. Its argument is that the
provision was a valid exercise of the war power because:
Unlike desertion, which carries the primary sanction of court-
martial and imprisonment, no similar primary check exists to deter
those individuals who flee this country to avoid fulfilling their
military obligations. Draft-evaders outside the country cannot be
apprehended there and imprisoned for their departure or their
failure to return. . . . [T]hey are not normally subject to extra-
dition. Only if they return to this country after they have accom-
plished their purpose of avoiding service in time of danger is it
possible to enforce criminal sanctions against their offense. This
delayed punishment would not aid in raising an army when it is
most necessary- during active hostilities. . . . Congress felt that,
for the difficult task of raising a wartime army, it needed the im-
mediate deterrent of loss of nationality for evasion by flight abroad.
By its very nature, such evasion is always a serious offense, never a
of the citizenship status. The District Court held that it was not. 192 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Cal.
1960). It should also be pointed out that the fourteenth amendment's reference to citizens
within the jurisdiction of the United States is meant only to exclude children of enemy aliens
and foreign diplomats. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 682 (1898).
120 Cf. Brennan, J., dissenting in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 113 (1958).
121 Indeed, there is opinion that it is the citizen's duty to submit to the imposition of the
death penalty. PLATO, THE CRITo DIALOGUE.
122 See pp. 4-6 supra.
123 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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technical one (as desertion may be); a severe deterrent is ap-
propriate.'24
This argument cannot be squared with the Government's later argument that
the provision is primarily remedial, and that its nature is not changed because
it "may incidentally add to the deterrent effect of the prison terms or fines which
may be imposed as true criminal penalties for the conduct."' 5 In addition, the
Government's argument that the purpose was remedial in that it sought to
prevent low morale is unsound for two reasons: a) one reason for punishing
antisocial acts is itself to support the morale of law-abiding citizens; and b) the
Government's claim is that: "Congress could well conclude that [morale would
be destroyed were it] to permit a ... [citizen] to absent himself during a time
of danger, only to return in better days to accept modest criminal penalties
and then resume his place in the community .... "126 The obvious way to avoid
the morale problem was to make the punishment less modest - which is what
Congress did do in enacting this provision.
In Schneider v. Rusk,'27 petitioner has presented a challenge to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1484, which provides for the expatriation of a naturalized citizen who sub-
sequently resides continuously in his native land for three years.'28 Mrs. Schneider
was a national of Germany at birth. Five years later, in 1939, she came with
her parents to the United States, where she lived continuously until 1954. In
1950, she became an American citizen. From 1954 to 1956, she studied
abroad, returning only temporarily to the United States. In 1956, she left the
United States to marry her present husband, with whom she has lived in
Germany ever since. While in Germany, she had two sons who are American
citizens.' She has never intended to give up her American citizenship, and
is not a citizen of Germany, or any other country. She brought suit for a
declaratory judgment after having been issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality
by the State Department.
Section 1484, whose target is the nationalized citizen living overseas, is
directed at an aspect of the dual national problem dealt with in 8 U.S.C. §
1482.130 These provisions dealing with dual nationals, naturalized citizens, and
their families cannot be justified any longer on the ground that such people
can create international friction. It is now too simple to settle these problems
by treaty or by devising rules for withholding diplomatic protection. The State
Department has resisted the latter solution's being enacted into law, though
applying it in practice, as being inconsistent with citizenship. Here, however,
a distinction must be made between citizenship as a relationship between the
individual and the country, and citizenship that establishes a relationship
between countries. It is doubtful that the State Department is still concerned
124 Brief for Appellant, pp. 45-46, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, No. 2, 1962 Term.
(Emphasis added, footnotes omitted.)
125 Id. at 57. (Emphasis added.)
126 Id. at 46.
127 No. 251, October Term, 1962.
128 See Appendix I.
129 They were born before she had lived abroad for three years. It should be noted that
her residence abroad might be considered a form of duress since she would otherwise be
forced to live apart from her family.
130 See Appendix I.
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over the apparent inconsistency between our position that one who is natural-
ized in the United States should be free of his duties to his native country and
the position that in some circumstances a citizen is not entitled to our protection
vis-a-vis his native country. Our original position was based on the principle
that one should be able to free himself from a country if he so desires. It is
not inconsistent to hold that one may choose not to free himself.
Any individual coming within the geographic jurisdiction of any country
establishes a relationship with that country which differs from citizenship only
in degree. The individual must obey the laws of the country, may not attempt
to overthrow the government, and may not even act so as to involve that
country in international friction. As an individual resides in a country over a
period of time, he establishes stronger relations with the country. Perhaps he
acquires property that requires protection, for which he pays taxes. For many
years the United States and its citizens have not appreciated the responsibility
that a citizen has to a country in which he has various interests. Particularly
in the economic sphere there has been little sense of obligation to the country
that protects the investment of the citizen. This situation is changing rapidly,
and with it there should be an acknowledged adjustment of the practices of
the State Department in protecting United States citizens who have heavy
obligations to a foreign country.
In United States ex rel. Marks v. Esperdy,'" ' the District Court held that
Marks had been expatriated by reason of his service in a foreign army, under
8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (3). Marks had served in Cuba with the Castro forces
before they came to power. He was wounded and returned to the United States.
After the Castro forces became the official government army, he returned to
Cuba, where he commanded a unit of the army and held the rank of captain.
Becoming disaffected with the Castro government, he returned to the United
States. Here he was arrested and held for deportation proceedings on the ground
that he was an alien who had entered the country unlawfully.'32 He brought
suit for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that he was being detained unlawfully
since he was a citizen. The court held that he was no longer a citizen, but that
he had not entered unlawfully since he was entitled to a judicial hearing on the
issue of whether he lost his citizenship, and this had not yet taken place at the
time of his entry. The writ was granted.
III. THE POWER TO IMPOSE EXPATRIATION
A. THF POWER TO WITHDRAW CrrlZENSHIP
The Constitution gives Congress the power "to establish an uniform rule
of naturalization."'33 Nowhere does it give Congress the power to take citizen-
ship away. The cases upholding denaturalization do so on the theory that
citizenship was granted on a fraudulent application, and was therefore void
131 203 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
132 The Government also claimed that he was deportable as an alien who had been con-
victed of a crime involving moral turpitude. The court ruled, however, that such conduct,
to permit deportation, must have been committed while petitioner was an alien.
133 U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8.
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ab initio. 4 The Court has never held the Naturalization Article of the Con-
stitution to imply the power to deprive one of his citizenship.13 It certainly
cannot be said that this power was considered by the founding fathers.
Citizenship is granted by the fourteenth amendment to all persons born
in the United States who are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
Congress does not have the power to deny the citizenship of such persons.136
For three Justices, the inquiry need go no further.' However, the majority view
has been that the fourteenth amendment does not restrict the power of Congress
to take citizenship away. It has never been supported with reason by the
Court." 8 The wording of the amendment is simple and straightforward. As
one commentator has remarked, "surely it was not necessary to add the words,
'and shall remain citizens.' "139
There is no historical justification for interpreting the fourteenth amend-
ment as permitting Congress to withdraw the grant of citizenship. 4 ' The
Act of 1865 did not impose expatriation as it is now conceived. The Act of
1868 permitted expatriation. The Act of 1906 was concerned with denaturali-
zation. The Act of 1907 implemented the Act of 1868, and raised presump-
tions of intent to expatriate.
Until 1915,"' there were no Supreme Court holdings that loss of citizen-
ship could be imposed. And even then, it is doubtful that the Court felt such
a ruling to be necessary to its decision. The first case that can be said to approach
a direct holding on the point was Savorgnan v. United States. 42 Even there,
however, the Court felt compelled to use equivocal language. The Court there
avoided the fourteenth amendment problem by taking the position that foreign
naturalization raises a presumption of the intent and desire to give up
134 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 98-99 (1958); id. at '126 n. 6 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting): "In the United States, denaturalization is based exclusively on the theory that
the individual obtained his citizenship by fraud, see Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 24."
The Act of Sept. 26, 1961 adds a provision for denaturalization when naturalization was
"illegally procured." 75 Stat. 656, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1451(a), (b) (Supp. III, 1962). The purpose
of the amendment was to avoid the necessity of proving fraudulent intent. H. R. REP. No.
1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-40 (1961). For the proposition that citizenship is void ab
initio when obtained by fraud, see, e.g., Battaglino v. Marshall, 172 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 829 (1950).
135 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). See note 23 supra.
136 Ibid.
137 Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S.
44, 65-66, 83-84 (1958) (dissenting opinions); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 92 (1958)
(opinion of Warren, C.J.); Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 138 (1958) (concurring
opinion).
138 In Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 58 n. 3 (1958), Justice Frankfurter delivered
the opinion of the Court. H{e thought the minority idea only worth a footnote. He distin-
guished United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), and rested his opinion on
dictum of Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 329 (1939): "As at birth she became a citizen of
the United States, that citizenship must be deemed to continue unless she has been de-
prived of it through the operation of a treaty or congressional enactment or by her voluntary
action in conformity with applicable legal principles." The distinction between the power
to deny and to withdraw citizenship may be that the latter requires an act of the citizen, the
former, only a status.
139 Boudin, Involuntary Loss of American Nationality, 73 Hxv. L. Rlv. 1510, 1528 (1960).
140 At least, "denationalization as a punishment . . . was never explicitly sanctioned
by this Government until 1940 and never tested against the Constitution until this day."
Trop v. Dulles 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 n. 32 (opinion of Warren, C.J.).
141 Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
142 338 U.S. 491 (1950).
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one's citizenship, to which act the Government consents. 4 By making the
presumption conclusive, the Court accomplished its sleight-of-hand trick.'"
The only case in which the Court has squarely held that the fourteenth amend-
ment did not restrict congressional power is Pere; v. Brownell,4' a decision
supported by neither historical, rational, nor empirical analysis.
The division of the Court is clear here. One side would deny Congress the
power to withdraw citizenship because the Constitution nowhere gives it that
power. 4' The majority view is that because the Constitution does not expressly
deny Congress the power to withdraw citizenship, it may be withdrawn. 4 "
There is no reconciling this basic conflict. One can only hope to avoid it by
posing the problem in other terms.
There is no question, however, that Perez was the first case (and, as yet,
the only case) to hold squarely that loss of citizenship could be imposed for
a reason other than that of implementing a citizen's desire to transfer his citizen-
ship - the desire evidenced by the acts of the citizen.
B. WHAT IS EXPATRIATION?
Although the Court in Perez v. Brownell decided that Perez had been
expatriated, it did not decide what that meant. This question was specifically
reserved. 4 ' Perez brought the action in an attempt to head off the effect of
a deportation order. Instead of bringing suit for an injunction, however, he
merely asked for a judgment declaring him to be a citizen. It is difficult to
understand how this could be considered a case or controversy out of the context
of the threatened deportation. Had the Court declared him to be a citizen,
the deportation order would have been automatically invalid. But the declara-
tion that he was an expatriate did not settle the pressing question- whether
an expatriate may be deported.
In Trop v. Dulles, we were treated to the spectacle of the Court's deciding
whether expatriation is penal or remedial, valid or cruel and unusual punish-
ment, or reasonable remedial regulation, without anyone's knowing what ex-
patriation is. The Chief Justice described it as
the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society.
It is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it
143 Consent implies petition.
144 See p. 38 infra.
145 356 U.S. 44 (1958). The Court here discarded the fiction of a conclusive pre-
sumption that had been used in the Savorgnan case.
146 Id. at 65-66, 68-69 (Warren, C. J., dissenting), 79-81 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
147 "But there is nothing in the terms, the context, the history or the manifest purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment to warrant drawing from it a restriction upon the power otherwise
possessed by Congress to withdraw citizenship." Id. at 58 n.3. (Emphasis added.)
148 Even if Congress can divest United States citizenship, it does not necessarily
follow that an American-born expatriate can be deported .... [S]ince the
deporting power has been held to be derived from the power to exclude...
it may well be that this power does not extend to persons born in this
country. As to them, deportation would perhaps find its justification only
as a punishment, indistinguishable from banishment....
Since this action for a declaratory judgment does not involve the va-
lidity of the deportation order against petitioner, it is unnecessary, as
the Government points out, to resolve the question of whether this peti-
tioner may be deported.
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 65 n. 6 (1958) (Warren, C. J., dissenting).
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destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries
in the development .... [It] strips the citizen of his status in the
national and international political community. His very existence
is at the sufferance of the country in which he happens to find
himself. . . . In short, the expatriate has lost the right to have
rights.'49
Justice Brennan treated the problem in an entirely different manner, wtich
indicated the reason he declined to join in the decision that expatriation was
a violation of the eighth amendment:
In its material forms no one can today judg6 the precise conse-
quences of expatriation, for happily American law has had little
experience with this status, and it cannot be said hypothetically to
what extent the severity of the status may be increased consistently
with the demands of due process. But it can be supposed that the
consequences of greatest weight, in terms of ultimate impact on the
petitioner, are unknown and unknowable.'
Adjudication of hypothetical and contingent conse-
quences is beyond the function of -this Court and the
incidents of expatriation are altogether indefinite....
It is also unnecessary to consider whether the conse-
quences would be different for the citizen expatriated under
another section than § 4 0 1 (g).'50
When examining the inefficacy of expatriation as a deterrent, Justice Brennan
pointed out that one who is not deterred by the possibility of the death penalty
will hardly be deterred by the contemplation of expatriation, "for none of us
yet knows its ramifications."'' Justice Frankfurter on the other hand declared
that, "Presumably a denationalized person becomes an alien vis-a-vis the United
States."'5
2
Justice Brennan's opinion indicates that he may be open to the develop-
ment of expatriation along new lines. It is submitted that the development
should be in the nature of a return to traditional concepts. Expatriation should
again mean the loss of the rights of citizenship, and the freedom to change
one's citizenship when he wishes to do so.
The most important loss to expatriated American citizens under the Acts
of 1865, 1906, 1907 was the loss of diplomatic protection. A second line of
development of expatriation was that equated with disfranchisement - the
loss of the right to vote and to hold public office. This right was, and still is,
taken from various classes of felons. Of the cases decided by the Supreme
Court, the rights denied petitioners were the right to vote, Mackenzie v. Hare,1
5 3
and, apparently, the right to an American passport, a requisite for diplomatic
protection, Savorgnan v. United States."4 In Perez v. Brownell, no rights were
adjudicated although Perez brought the action to prevent deportation. These
three decisions, the only ones in which the Court has upheld expatriation, were
based on Congress's power to regulate foreign affairs. As a justification for
149 356 U.S. at 101-02.
150 Id. at 110.
151 Id. at 112.
152 Id. at 127.
153 239 U.S. 299 (1915). The decision operated to deny the vote because the state de-
prived aliens of the vote.
154 338 U.S. 491 (1950).
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expatriation, this power should be limited, where applicable, to the-power to
withhold diplomatic protection.
It would seem that many of the problems that have appeared so large
might be handled by dealing specifically with the right at stake. In Trop v.
Dulles, the question was whether Trop should be given a passport. However,
the Court did not even suggest that the problem was actually whether Trop
should be allowed to travel abroad and then retuin to the United States. The
issue at stake in Perez v. Brownell was never discussed; it was whether Perez
should be allowed to remain in the United States. The same issue will be
before the Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez5  this term. In Rusk v.
Cort,58 the issue will be whether one who was guilty of the same conduct as
Mendoza-Martinez may be excluded from the country. The Court should not
decide the citizenship issue in these two cases without examining the results
of its determination. It may well be that both are declared expatriated. But
that decision would not go to the issue, which is whether a native citizen may
be deported or excluded from the country.
With expatriation understood to mean loss of the rights of citizenship,
the only rights of citizenship that it makes any sense at all to deny are the
right to diplomatic protection, the right to hold public office, and the right to
vote. Denial of the right to enter or remain in the United States is no different
from banishment. Treating expatriation as loss of the rights of citizenship may
not satisfy the desire of Congress to disown unwanted citizens completely, unless
banishment is imposed. But the only purpose banishment would serve would
be that of ihsulating the country from unsavory citizens. The same purpose
is served by imprisonment.
C. BASES FOR CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO EXPATRIATE
None of the acts that are declared to effect expatriation is protected
by the Constitution from congressional prohibition. The citizen has no con-
stitutional right to be free from any disability attached to his naturalization
in, or his swearing allegiance to, a. foreign country. 5 ' He has no protected right
to serve in the armed forces, hold public office, or vote in a political election
in a foreign country. He has no constitutional right to desert from the armed
forces of the United States, to commit acts of treason, to conspire or attempt
to overthrow the government of the United States, or to evade the draft. There-
fore, if Congress has the power to regulate such conduct, it may do so without
the restrictions that confine it n other areas. Thus, while Congress would
not be restricted from regulating voting in a foreign country, its attempt to
regulate political speech in a foreign country would be measured by different
standards."'
There are three powers that Congress has called upon to justify expatriation:
155 No. 2, 1962 Term. The same issue was presented in U.S. ex rel. Marks v. Esperdy,
203 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
156 No. 3, 1962 Term.
157 Quaere whether he has a right to reside abroad permanently. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1482,
1484 (set out in Appendix I).
158 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 106 n.2 (1958) (Brennan J., concurring).
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1) the power to regulate citizenship; 2) the power to regulate foreign affairs;
and 3) the power to defend the country- the war power.
1. The Power to Regulate Citizenship
The power to regulate citizenship may be divided into two separate
categories: a) the power to consent to a citizen's expatriation; and b) the
power to regulate standards of conduct required for citizenship.
a) There is no question but that Congress has the power to consent to a
citizen's expatriation and the power to refuse to permit expatriation in appro-
priate circumstances. Intentional and voluntary expatriation, permitted by
Congress and effected in the prescribed manner,'59 should make the citizen
an alien vis-aL-vis the United States. All duties and obligations, except those
applicable to aliens, should be considered canceled by both the citizen and the
government.
b) One of the purposes of Congress in providing for loss of citizenship
has been to prescribe standards of conduct required of citizens. The validity
of this purpose is questionable. However, once one grants that the Constitu-
tion does not prevent Congress from withdrawing citizenship, it becomes diffi-
cult to find constitutional limits to the power.
The Court has never given support to the notion that Congress could
regulate citizenship by expatriating unworthy citizens. The only indication
that the Court has given that there might be such a power is in the dissenting
opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Trop v. Dulles: "Can it be said that there
is no rational nexus between refusal to perform this ultimate duty of American
citizenship [the duty to bear arms] and legislative withdrawal of that citizen-
ship?"' 6 ° He cast doubt on this implication, however, by answering that Con-
gress would have this power if it believed that expatriation would aid in win-
ning the war, linking this power to the war power.
The Government had argued in Trop, "that the necessary nexus to the
granted power [the war power] is to be found in the idea that legislative with-
drawal of citizenship is justified . . . because Trop's desertion constituted a
refusal to perform one of the highest duties of American citizenship - the
bearing of arms. .... ."'. Justice Brennan considered this argument, found
that expatriation so imposed could be nothing but retribution,'62 and held
that expatriation could not be imposed as a consequence of desertion
because "the requisite rational relation between this statute [section 401 (g)
of the Nationality Act of 1940] and the war power does not appear .... ,163
Nothing is solved, said Justice Brennan, "by the uncritical reference to service in
the armed forces as 'the ultimate duty of American citizenship.' "164 The Gov-
ernment has not given up on the argument despite Justice Brennan's criticism.
159 Congress may prescribe acts by means of which a citizen may effect his expatriation.
Congress may even provide that certain acts raise a presumption of intent to expatriate.
However, the presumption should not be conclusive. See p. 38 infra.
160 Id. at 121-22.
161 Id. at 112 (Brennan, J., concurring).
162 Ibid.
163 Id. at 114.
164 Id. at 113.
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In Mackey v. Mendoza-Martinez, the Government, apparently downgrading
service in the armed forces to the penultimate, argued that the ultimate duty
of a citizen is to submit to the criminal jurisdiction of the United States when
he is wanted for prosecution."'
Clearly, Congress has the power to refuse to grant citizenship to an
alien deemed unworthy. Whether Congress has the power to take away citizen-
ship for the same reason is, of course, a quite different matter. The major
distinction between the citizen and the alien that is relevant here is that the
citizen has the right to the political franchise, the right to diplomatic protection,
and most important of all the right to live in the United States. Further, Con-
gress has the power to divest the citizen, in appropriate circumstances, of the
right to exercise the political franchise and the right to diplomatic protection.
The issue that the Court must squarely face is whether Congress also has the
power to impose banishment - either as a penalty or as a device to regulate
the numbers and kinds of persons who are physically present in this country.
This is the heart of the expatriation problem.
The Congressional power to deprive unworthy citizens of the right to
vote 6 and to hold public office is used to regulate the political franchise itself.
In general, this power has been exercised only after conviction as a felon.'
The purpose of the deprivation is not complex. A democracy can exist only
with a responsible electorate and a responsible bureaucracy. Conviction of a
felony is a disqualification, just as is infancy or idiocy. Insofar as expatriation
means disfranchisement, there is no objection to its imposition on a convicted
felon. But when this disability is applied to other classes of citizens, its imposi-
tion is highly suspect.
In Murphy v. Ramsey,'68 the Court upheld the disfranchisement of polyga-
mists." No criminal conviction was required; only a nonjudicial determination
of fact by the election board. In Perez v. Brownell, it was held that loss of the
rights of citizenship was imposed to solve a problem in the regulation of foreign
affairs. It was not imposed to regulate the franchise. But when dis-
franchisement is imposed to regulate the franchise itself, as in the disfranchise-
ment of felons, the existence of the danger must first be established by conviction
of a criminal act. When Chief Justice Warren distinguished between the dis-
franchisement and imprisonment of a bank robber, 7 ' he did not imply that the
bank robber could be disfranchised without first being adjudged a felon in a
criminal trial. Insofar as his citation to Murphy v. Ramsey is taken to imply
otherwise, it must be considered only as misleading, and should be clarified at
the first opportunity. As the greater protection of criminal procedure is required
165 Brief for Appellants, p, 27, 362 U.S. 384 (1960); now No. 2, 1962 Term, sub nom.
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, with the same argument now in Brief for Appellant, p. 47.
See pp. 20-21 supra.
166 Generally the right to vote may only be withdrawn by the states. See Holtzoff, Loss
of Civil Rights by Conviction of Crime, 6 FED. ProB. 18 (1942).
167 But see Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885).
168 Ibid.
169 The vote was in a Territory subject to the regulation of the federal government.
170 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96-97 (1958).
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to deprive a person of physical liberty, so a civil procedure is inadequate to de-
prive a person of the right to vote - political liberty.'
Murphy v. Ramsey does have an element that is lacking in most instances
of disfranchisement, and is lacking in disfranchisement for bank robbery.
Disfranchisement was imposed in Murphy to prevent polygamists from voting
to make polygamy legal.' There is no danger that a deserter, or bank robber,
would succeed in making desertion or robbery legal. But the objection to the
Murphy case is that disfranchising those with a particular belief, because of
the belief, violates the first amendment. It is no different from disfranchising
Jehovah's Witnesses, atheists, fascists, or other unpopular groups, insofar as
it differentiates between those beliefs that are "consistent" with our political
and social system, and those that are not.
On the basis of the Murphy case, those citizens who, by the nature of
their divided allegiance or dual nationality, are faced with a conflict of interest
might reasonably be denied the franchise if it could be shown that a conflict
of interest existed in fact. This concession would go far to satisfy the Con-
gressional appetite for undivided allegiance, and would encourage dual nationals
to make a distinct choice between countries. In addition, those convicted of crimes
listed in 8 U.S.C. §1481 (a) (9) (concerning violent overthrow of the country)
might reasonably be denied the franchise. However, grave danger would be
encountered in distinguishing conflict of interest from constitutionally protected
political belief. 3
There is another class of citizens whose conduct invites imposed expatria-
tion - expatriation meaning the loss of the right to vote, to hold office, and
the right to diplomatic protection. This class consists of those whose being
abroad is in itself disapproved; specifically, those who take refuge in a foreign
country to escape criminal prosecution in the United States. 4 It is absurd,
however, to suggest that these citizens be refused entry to the United States
when they are willing to submit to prosecution.
2. The Power to Regulate Foreign Affairs
Withdrawal of diplomatic protection is justified in a number of situations:
when the citizen is in refuge from prosecution here, when the citizen is a dual
national residing in his "other" country; when (and to the extent that) the
citizen has assumed obligations to another country; and when the citizen holds
public office in or enters the armed services of another country. 5 This remedy
might not, however, seem as efficient in some cases as automatic decitizenship,
171 Compare Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); Gerende v. Board
of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1961); and American Communications Ass'n, 0.I.O. v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382 (1950); with Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
172 The statute specifically stated, 22 Stat. 30 (1882), in § 9, that the vote was not
to be denied only on the basis of belief. The reasoning of the Murphy opinion, however,
makes it clear that it was this danger that the Court feared.
173 See note 171 supra.
174 It is theoretically possible for an American abroad to be employed by the United
States Government and to vote by absentee ballot. Withdrawal of diplomatic protection
would only be justified if diplomatic efforts at extradition failed. It is not suggested that it
be used as a punishment.
175 This is not meant to suggest that the State Department be given wide discretion to
withhold diplomatic protection.
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as interpreted in Perez v. Brownell. The whole class of situations that might
be called "meddling in affairs of a foreign country" seems at first glance particu-
larly amenable to the solution prescribed by the majority in the Perez case."" This
position was explained by Justice Brennan:
Expatriation... has the advantage of acting automatically, for the
very act of casting the ballot is the act of denationalization, which
could have the effect of cutting off American responsibility for the
consequences. If a foreign government objects, our answer should
be conclusive - the voter is no longer one of ours. - . . Congress
might reasonably believe that in these circumstances there is no
acceptable alternative .... 7 7
Four important questions arise from this theory: granting that Congress has
the power to regulate foreign affairs and citizenship, a) may Congress use its
power to regulate citizenship to regulate foreign affairs; b) is expatriation, as
alienation, "reasonably calculated to achieve this legitimate end" ;171 c) is there
an acceptable alternative; and d) if there is an acceptable alternative, may
the Court require Congress to use it.
a) May the power to regulate citizenship be used to regulate foreign
affairs?
In the Perez case, the majority did not hesitate in declaring that the power
to regulate citizenship could be used to regulate foreign affairs. As precedent
the Court relied on the Mackenzie and Savorgnan cases, both of which presented
situations in which it was the fact of dual citizenship itself that was undesirable.
In Perez, it was an act, voting in a foreign election, rather than a status, that
created the alleged problem. The Court was intrigued by the fact that taking
away the citizenship solved the problem, and it overlooked the fact that, unlike
Mackenzie and Savorgnan, the citizenship without more was not objectionable.
Instead of proscribing voting in a foreign country in a traditional manner - as
it proscribed negotiation with a foreign country, for example - Congress used
the power to regulate citizenship to avoid the harm of a potentially dangerous
act.
79
Unwise as it may be, there seem to be no constitutional objections to such
a device. Questions about the use of the taxing power to regulate were con-
cerned with whether the power to regulate itself was within the power of Con-
gress. It seems to have been conceded that if Congress had the power to
regulate, it could exercise it by using its power to tax. 8 We must conclude,
therefore, that the use of the power to regulate citizenship to regulate foreign
affairs is not unconstitutional as such, and must be challenged on other
grounds.
176 See pp. 14-18 supra, for discussion to the effect that the problem treated by the Perez
majority was not the problem which Congress had had in mind.
177 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 106 (concurring opinion).
178 Id. at 107.
179 See 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1958). Another argument against the interpretation of Con-
gressional intent made by the Perez majority (i.e., to prevent meddling in foreign affairs)
is that Congress never has attempted to proscribe voting in a foreign country as it has
private negotiation.
180 See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). See also "Note: Motives in
Tax Legislation," 1 FREUND, SUTHERLAND, Howz & BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 217
(1954).
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b) Is expatriation, as alienation, reasonably calculated to achieve the
legitimate end?
The following are the three statutory bases for expatriation which might be
said to constitute meddling by the American citizen in the affairs of a foreign
country:
(i) Voting in a foreign election.181
The effectiveness of expatriation depends on whether it allows the United
States to answer a foreign government's complaint of meddling in its affairs
by declaring, conclusively, that the voter is no longer one of ours. This hypothesis
is vulnerable in three respects.
First, it may not be enough to answer that he is no longer one of ours.
He was one of ours when he went to the polling place, took a ballot, went
into a booth, marked the ballot, folded it, and prepared to drop it into the
box. He did not become expatriated until- at the earliest- the ballot was
irretrievably cast.
Second, it is questionable whether the answer may be considered con-
clusive at all. If the vote were cast under duress, the citizen would not be
expatriated." 2 There would be no final determination of this matter until,
in a proper judicial trial, the Government proved that the act was voluntary .'8
There is no indication that a finding of duress operates to provide automatic
repatriation. It must be assumed that expatriation is not conclusive until the
citizen has been given an opportunity to present his case in a proper United
States court.' There is no limitation on the time he must bring such an
action. In fact, until Rusk v. Cort,"'8 it was in doubt whether he could bring
any action until he had been denied a passport, and taken rather elaborate
procedural steps. Perez, who did not face the problems of Cort (who is out of the
country and denied a passport), did not bring his action until he was threat-
ened with deportation. The election in which Perez voted was in 1946. There
was no final determination that he was expatriated until 1958. The Govern-
ment contends that automatic expatriation of draft evaders will operate to
relieve international tension in the same way that expatriation operated in
Perez. Yet Mendoza-Martinez has still not been conclusively expatriated, more
than seventeen years after his draft evasion."8 0 Thus, the United States can
give no immediate conclusive answer to a protesting country.
A third question arises when the citizen who votes in a foreign election
181 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5).
182 E.g., Takano v. Dulles, 116 F. Supp. 307 (D. Hawaii 1953) (voting in Japan under
fear that failure to do so might hamper procedures for return to the United States); Uyeno
v. Acheson, 96 F. Supp. 510 (W.D. Wash. 1951) voting in Japan under fear of losing ration
card); Arikawa v. Acheson, 83 F. Supp. 473 (S.D. Cal. 1949) (voting in Japan in 1946
under influence of General MacArthur's appeal to all women to vote).
183 Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958).
184 United States ex rel. Marks v. Esperdy, 203 F. Supp. 389 (S.D. N.Y. 1962).
185 369 U.S. 367 (1962). In a 5-3 decision, the Court 'held that a person outside the
United States, who had been denied a passport on the ground that he had been expatriated,
was not restricted to the procedures prescribed by 8 U.S.C. § 1503 (1958), 66 Stat. 273
(1952).
186 In Brief for Appellant, p. 46 n. 26, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, No. 2, 1962 Term,
the Government stated that the provision "has been liberally interpreted to the advantage of
those who return . . . while the war or emergency still continues." Although this statement
is somewhat misleading, it carries enough meaning to be relevant.
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is also a citizen of that country. Certainly the rationale of the Perez case would
not apply. The foreign country would not be able to complain that one of its
own citizens had voted in its election. The Court did not consider this fact
in Perez. There. was no determination of whether Perez was a dual citizen
or not. The Court, in both the majority.. and dissenting.. opinions, stated
only that Perez was born in the United States and was taken to Mexico at an
early age by his parents. Counsel for Perez stoutly denied that Perez had
voluntarily taken on another citizenship,'8 9 but never explicitly stated whether
Perez had or had not been born a dual citizen or had or had not gained dual
citizenship derivatively through his parents:
The Government suggests that petitioner "appears" to be a
dual national (Br., p. 35). The District Court made no finding,
nor did the Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . , that
petitioner has or had any citizenship other than the American one
here in issue.
We should also correct the Government's statement (Br. p. 36)
that "There is no reason to believe that [the petitioner] will be
unable to live in Mexico." There is "reason to believe" quite the
opposite -that petitioner can not take up life in Mexico if deported
there.. . . [T]he District Court made no finding to support the
Government's easy assumption that upon petitioner's deportation
he can become a permanent inhabitant of Mexico. 90
This statement does not give us the answer. It says only that there is no evi-
dence in the record that Perez was a dual citizen.
Petitioner's counsel cannot be blamed for lack of foresight. He certainly
had no way of knowing that the Court would develop a new theory on which
to base the justification of the statute. To him, the important tactic must have
been to avoid the implication that Perez, being a dual citizen, had exercised
his choice of citizenship by taking advantage of the right of Mexican citizenship
to vote.'" '
The rationale of the majority opinion in Perez must be held to be applicable
only to those who are not dual citizens -a result in direct opposition to the
purpose of Congress. " '
(ii) Serving in a foreign armed force."s
In United States ex rel. Marks v. Esperdy, ' the Court held, on the
authority of the Perez case, that 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (3), imposing expatriation
on one who serves in the armed forces of a foreign country, was constitutional.
The Court followed the Perez rationale:
187 356 U.S. at 46.
188 Id. at 63 n. 2. The opinion implies that the dissenting Justices considered Perez not
to be a dual citizen since it discusses statelessness. Id. at 64-65. The separate dissents of
Justice Douglas, id. at 79-80, and Justice Whittaker, id. at 84-85, seem to imply the same.
189 Brief for Petitioner, pp. 14, 20.
190 Reply Brief for Petitioner, pp. 2-3 n. 2.
191 But cf. Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952) (dictum); Jalbuena v. Dulles,
254 F.2d 379 (3d Cir. 1958).
192 See note 90 supra. Appellee in Rusk v. Cort bases an argument on the assumption
that Perez was a dual national. Brief for Appellee, pp. 36-37. The Government makes the
same assumption. Brief for the Appellant, p. 41, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, No. 2,
1962 Term.
193 8 U.S.C. 1481 (a) (3).
194 203 F. Supp. 389 (S.D. N.Y. 1962).
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It would indeed seem obvious that service by a United States
citizen in the armed forces of another nation ... carries with it
even greater danger of embroiling the international relations of
the United States than would mere voting in a foreign election.
This court will not deny to Congress the reasonable belief that
under the present hazardous international circumstances there is
no acceptable alternative to expatriation as a means of avoiding
possible embarrassment in and jeopardy to our relations with other
nations. 95
The analytical difficulties inherent in the Perez decision are more obvious
in this case.
The Marks case demonstrates the fact that there is no automatic expatria-
tion. If a foreign government complained of an American's service in a foreign
armed force, the United States could not answer forthwith that the American
was no longer a citizen. In this case, the Government sought to deport the
relator on the ground that he had unlawfully entered the country as an alien.
The Court held that this claim was not valid because the relator did not become
an alien until the present judicial determination.'
Again the question of dual nationals must be considered. It is recognized
that a dual national has duties of allegiance to both of his countries.'97 Certainly
the United States will not become embroiled against its will in controversy
with the country in whose army the dual national serves voluntarily. 9 And
a country against which the dual citizen's country might fight would not be
justified in holding the United States responsible. Therefore, the conclusion is
again reached that if alienation makes sense at all as a regulation of foreign
affairs, it makes sense only in the case of one who has only American citizenship.
This result also is in direct conflict with the congressional purpose. "'
(iii) Holding public employment in a foreign country. 0
It seems absurd to think that a foreign government that hires an American
citizen will then object to his employment as meddling in the affairs of that
government. The remedy of that government, if it should object, is obvious-
it can dismiss him and deport him. The statute applies only to those Americans
who are also nationals of the foreign country and to those who take an oath
195 Id. at 395. But see 18 U.S.C. §§ 958-59 (1958), which proscribe as a criminal offense,
in certain circumstances, service in foreign armed forces.
196 Although Section 356 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1488 states that it is the "performance" by a national of an expatriatory
act which results in loss of nationality, whether the relator lost his citizen-
ship can only be established finally by a judicial determination.... At the
time of his entry into this country ... the relator could not have obtained
the entry documents as an alien without acknowledging an expatriation
which had not yet been determined.
Id. at 396.
197 Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952) (dictum); Jalbuena v. Dulles, 254
F.2d 379 (3d Cir. 1958).
198 Expatriation will not result from involuntary service, Nishikawa v. United States, 356
U.S. 129 (1958), despite the fact that involuntary service would affect the foreign affairs
of the United States in the same way as would voluntary service. In fact, involuntary service
was the cause of intense international friction in the nineteenth century.
199 Section 401(c) of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1168, provided for the ex-
patriation of one who served in the armed forces of a foreign nation only if he were a citizen
of that nation. The absence of such a qualification in the present provision only broadens
the class attacked. It does not exclude dual nationals.
200 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a)(4).
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of allegiance to the country. Those in the former class would surely not be
considered to be meddling, and the statute, if based on the power to regulate
foreign affairs, certainly should not apply to them.
It is concluded that expatriation, as alienation, is not reasonably related
to the regulation of foreign affairs because it is not effective in avoiding possible
harm.
c) Is there an acceptable alternative to expatriation, as alienation, to
prevent harm to the United States from American citizens who meddle in the
affairs of a foreign nation?
In Perez v. Brownell, the Chief Justice, finding that Congress had no
power to impose loss of citizenship against the will of a citizen, said that if
Congress believed that there was danger in a citizen's voting in a foreign election,
Congress could "proscribe such activity and assess appropriate punishment." ''
If the United States should make it a criminal offense to vote in a foreign
country, it could answer an objecting government with an apology and a
promise to punish the citizen. Despite the opinion in the Perez case, it seems
clear that if Congress had in mind the problems of meddling stated by the
Court, it used expatriation as a deterrent. As such, it would be subject to the
objections raised in the Trop case.202 A normal criminal deterrent would be more
sensible, and equally effective. Serving in a foreign armed force is already
proscribed by a criminal statute.0 '
d) May the Court require Congress to use an alternative?
In Perez v. Brownell, Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority, held
that the Court was limited in its inquiry to whether or not expatriation was an
effective means of avoiding international friction. No question of a possible
alternative was raised. However, concurring in Trop v. Dulles, Justice Brennan
(one of the majority in Perez) implied that the question in the Perez case had
been whether Congress could have reasonably believed that there was no
acceptable alternative, considering the harshness of expatriation and the im-
portance of the national interest involved.0 4 He did not discuss the alternative
offered by the Chief Justice, that of making voting in a foreign election a
criminal offense, but apparently he found that it did not meet his standards.
On what basis did Justice Brennan decide that Congress might reasonably
believe that the alternative was not an acceptable one? Congress itself gave
no indication. Indeed, it has been shown that Congress never even considered
that it was dealing with the problem (meddling in foreign affairs) the Court
found to be so dangerous.0 5 Justice Brennan, by joining the majority in the Perez
case, put himself in the position of inventing a congressional purpose which
would validate the statute, and then having to decide whether Congress could
201 356 U.S. at 78 (dissenting opinion).
202 In addition, there would be a lack of due process unless proper criminal procedures
were provided.
203 See 18 U.S.40. §§ 958-59.
204 356 U.S. at 106-07.
205 See notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
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have believed that there was no acceptable alternative means if it had been
legislating to achieve the purpose the Court invented for it.
In Schneider v. State,2"' the state had passed a statute limiting the distribu-
tion of handbills to prevent the littering of the streets. The Court stated that
the same purpose could be accomplished by prosecuting those who did the
littering. That it might not be as effective a means as restricting the distribution
was not a determining factor. The Schneider case presents an example of the
usual application of the less-restrictive-alternative theory. Generally, the doctrine
is applied to insure that conduct that is protected by the Constitution will not
be inhibited as an incidental effect of the means used to regulate conduct that
is not protected.!"7 In Schneider, the Court was protecting freedom of speech.
In Perez, there was no protected activity involved, but there was a protected
status - citizenship. Just as we have seen the protection of the first amendment
give way when Congress has felt it was in the national interest,"'8 here the
right to citizenship was withdrawn in the national interest.
The Perez majority opinion implied that there was no right to citizenship
in the sense that there is a right to freedom of speech. Despite his reference to
the alternative theory, Justice Brennan indicated that he was in agreement
with the majority when he said that "Perez v. Brownell did not raise questions
under the First Amendment, which of course would have the effect in appro-
priate cases of limiting congressional power otherwise possessed. -" °2 0 9 It is un-
fortunate that Justice Brennan did not further analyze his position in the Perez
case, since his opinion intimates a restriction on the apparently limitless scope
of power granted to Congress by that case's majority opinion. The force and
direction of the limitation need explication.
"Perhaps the most basic postulate of judicial review is that the legislature
possesses a generous choice of means."21 The Perez and Trop cases demonstrate
that the postulate may be given very different meanings. In the Perez case,
Justice Frankfurter declared that: "The importance and extreme delicacy of
the matters here sought to be regulated demand that Congress be permitted
ample scope in selecting appropriate modes for accomplishing its purpose." 211
The determination of the limits of the scope was restricted to an examination
of the theoretical possibility of the means chosen achieving the legitimate end.
In the Trop case, he stated that there is no limitation on the war power "other
than what the Due Process Clause commands."2 "2 Justice Douglas interpreted
this concept to mean that,
it (is) possible for any one of the many legislative powers to be used
to wipe out or modify specific rights granted by the Constitution,
206 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
207 See FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 60-87 (1961).
208 See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
209 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 106 n.2. Only Justice Whittaker would have required an
alternative, but his objection went to the lack of danger in fact. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S.
at 84-85. If he had held the view that nondangerous voting in foreign elections was pro-
tected activity, his opinion would have been parallel to the Schneider decision.
210 FREUND, Op. cit. supra note 207, at 61.
211 356 U.S. at 60.
212 356 U.S. at 120-21.
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provided the action taken is moderate and does not do violence to
the sensibilities of a majority of this Court.218
To others, the fact that the legislature possesses a generous choice of means
by which to regulate indicates that the legislature will be required to choose
that means that will be least restrictive of individual liberty. This was clearly
the position of Chief Justice Warren in the Perez case."14
Under a due process test, the relevant factors are the seriousness of the
danger to the United States from the citizen's conduct, the possibility of an
effective alternative remedy, and the existence of evidence of transfer of alle-
giance. If the danger is great, and no effective alternative is available, a number
of the Justices would not be shocked by the imposition of expatriation, as aliena-
tion, despite the fact that there was no transfer or lack of allegiance.
In the Perez case, the majority found that there was serious danger to the
United States from a citizen's voting in a foreign election,215 that there was no
effective alternative,21 and that the conduct indicated a transfer of allegiance."'
The dissenters held the opposite view. Therefore, despite the different theoretical
approaches posed in the opinions, there would have been the same disagreement
even if all the Justices had adopted the due process rationale.
The important difference between the majority and the dissenters lies in
the approach employed to determine the validity of the legislative assumptions
concerning the seriousness of the danger, the existence of an effective alternative
means of regulation, and whether the conduct implies a transfer of allegiance.
The majority spoke only of the belief of Congress. However, in determining the
reasonableness of Congress' belief, empirical evidence should be examined.
Justice Frankfurter did not seem to recognize a distinction between the logical
and the reasonable. When he examined the statute for a rational nexus, he
determined only whether there was a logical possibility that the means prescribed
would achieve the desired end. When he talked of limiting congressional belief
to the reasonable, he appears to have been talking of no limitation at all.
A reasonable belief is one based on empirical evidence. But if one is of the
opinion that collecting evidence and drawing conclusions from it is purely a
legislative function, then any conclusion .the legislature reaches will be con-
sidered reasonable.
This approach has its greatest validity in questions of broad policy. For
example, in the Perez case, the dissenters (with the possible exception of Justice
Whittaker) indicated that they would accept a legislative judgment that a
citizen's voting in a foreign election was dangerous to the United States.
In deciding whether there is an effective alternative to expatriation, how-
ever, the validity of this approach is subject to greater doubt. There seems to
be no reason for making the assumption that the legislature examined and
rejected as unworkable all possible alternative means of regulation; the assump-
213 356 U.S. at 82-84.
214 356 U.S. at 78.
215 More precisely, it decided that Congress might reasonably believe that there was a
serious danger.
216 More precisely, as stated by Justice Brennan explaining the decision, that Congress
might reasonably believe there was no acceptable alternative. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 106-07.
217 Again, that Congress "has so interpreted this conduct, "not irrationally." Perez v.
Brownell, 356 U.S. at 60-61.
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tion was not made in the Schneider case."' And the Court has recently held
that California could not regulate narcotics traffic - certainly unprotected
activity- by punishing one for addiction, pointing out that "there are...
countless [other] fronts on which those evils may be legitimately attacked."2"'
In that case it was clear that the legislature of California had rejected the
alternative means of regulation. The Court in Perez should have considered
the alternative of criminal proscription suggested by the Chief Justice, and
explained why it was not satisfactory.
In determining whether the conduct involved a transfer of allegiance from,
or a lack of allegiance to, the United States, it is even more difficult
to accept Justice Frankfurter's approach. Allegiance is a state of mind, not an
objective act. To say that Congress can determine in advance that an act
provides conclusive evidence of a citizen's allegiance is to say that in many
cases "Congress [can] .. . turn white to black.... "2 2 0 The determination of a
citizen's allegiance can be made only in each case. In the Nishikawa case,
Justice Black declared that,
whether citizenship has been voluntarily relinquished is a question
to be determined on the facts of each case after a judicial trial in full
conformity with the Bill of Rights. Although Congress may provide
rules of evidence for such trials, it cannot declare that such equivocal
acts as service in a foreign army, participation in a foreign election
or desertion from our armed forces, establish a conclusive presump-
tion of intention to throw off American nationality.221
Even if the Court is not willing to go so far as to require intent to expatriate,
it may require that the trier of fact determine that there was in fact a transfer
of allegiance from, or a lack of allegiance to, the United States. This approach
would be in accord with Kawakita v. United States. 222
It is true that such a requirement will provide an additional obstacle to
answering an objecting nation conclusively that the offending person is not an
American citizen. However, a judicial trial is necessary for a determination of
whether the citizen did act as alleged, whether he acted voluntarily or under
duress, and whether the election in question was a "political" election,22 the
army served in was the army of a foreign nation,224 or the employment was one
for which an oath of allegiance was required. The additional requirement would
not be significant.
e) Summary and conclusion
In the regulation of foreign affairs, the only right of citizenship that it is
reasonable to withdraw is the right to diplomatic protection. The withdrawal
of that right is as effective as withdrawal of citizenship itself. In those cases
218 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
219 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 360, 367-68 (1962).
220 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. at 84 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
221 Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 139 (1958) (concurring opinion).
222 343 U.S. 717 (1952). Transfer of allegiance should be no more difficult to prove
than intent.
223 Justice Frankfurter stated in Perez that, "Specific applications [of the term 'polItical'l
are of course open to judicial challenge, as are other general categories in the law, by a
'gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.'" 356 U.S. at 60.
224 United States ex rel. Marks v. Esperdy, 203 F. Supp. 389, 394-95 (S.D. N.Y. 1962).
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that are concerned with meddling in foreign affairs, such as the Perez case,
withdrawal of the right to diplomatic protection is relevant to permit the host
country to punish illegal meddling. Withdrawal of citizenship is unreasonable
because it cannot achieve the end to which it is directed. The United States
cannot answer an objecting nation conclusively that the offender is not an
American citizen. A more effective way to prevent international friction from
conduct deemed dangerous is to deter the conduct by the imposition of traditional
criminal penalties. And an effective alternative means to prevent international
friction should be used instead of alienation, since the latter destroys a con-
stitutionally protected status-citizenship.
3. The War Power
The first step in determining whether Congress may call on the war power
to justify the imposition of expatriation must be to decide whether expatriation
can (or whether Congress could reasonably believe that expatriation can) aid
in successfully waging war. In Trop v. Dulles, the majority decided that ex-
patriation was prescribed as a consequence of desertion in order to deter desertion.
Four of the majority held that its use violated the eighth amendment. Justice
Brennan, concurring in the result, held that expatriation could not be an
effective deterrent, and could in no other way substantially aid the war power.
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the dissenters, found that it was not for the
Court "to deny that Congress might reasonably have believed the morale and
fighting efficiency of our troops would be impaired if our soldiers knew that
their fellows who had abandoned them in their time of greatest need were to
remain in the communion of our citizens.
-225
The reasons for Justice Brennan's desertion from the Perez majority are
instructive. He said: "It is obvious that expatriation cannot in any wise avoid
the harm apprehended by Congress. After the act of desertion, only punishment
can follow, for the harm has been done." '226 He later added: "And as a deterrent
device this sanction [expatriation] would appear of little effect .... " 22 Unlike
the majority opinion in the Perez case, Justice Brennan here examined what
the harm actually apprehended by Congress was - not what it reasonably might
have been. However, after finding that the actual purpose could not support
the statute, he examined Justice Frankfurter's suggestion. He admitted that it
"may find some - though necessarily slender - support in reason." However,
he found that "any substantial achievement.., of Congress' legitimate purposes
under the war power seems fairly remote," and that "it is at the same time
abundantly clear that these ends could more fully be achieved by alternative
methods not open to these objections." 2 8 Thus, when alternatives exist, Justice
Brennan will require their use if the rational nexus is weak, and the penalty
harsh.
Justice Frankfurter's opinion is highly unrealistic. Just what is meant by
the statement that the deserters would "remain in the communion of our
225 356 U.S. at 122.
226 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 109-10.
227 Id. at 112.
228 Id. at 114.
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citizens"? First, they could go to jail. Second, they could receive dishonorable
discharges. Third, they might be shot. Fourth, they could lose all G.I. benefits.
Fifth, they could lose all rights normally lost by felons, such as the right to vote,
to hold public office, and to practice certain professions.
Even following the due process analysis, the danger seems so small,229
and the alternatives already in existence so inclusive, that it is certainly shocking
to take away all the rights of citizenship - particularly when there is no evidence
of a transfer or lack of allegiance. Upon closer examination, one is even more
shocked. The only right of citizenship relevant to the "communion of our
citizens" argument of Justice Frankfurter is the right to remain in the United
States. Essentially, he was supporting the power of Congress to prescribe
banishment as a regulatory device.
Expatriation for treason requires no different analysis. Banishment may
be less shocking in the case of treason, however, since that necessarily shows a
transfer or lack of allegiance. But it is difficult to see how banishment would
aid in the successful prosecution of the war. Quite to the contrary, it would
enable the traitor to aid the enemy with impunity. The safest place for the
country to put a traitor during the war is prison. If, at the close of the war,
Congress wishes to release the traitor and deport him, it cannot then support
this action under the war power. It may, however, declare that a treasonable
act is evidence of a transfer of allegiance, and provide its consent to the citizen's
voluntary expatriation.
It has been suggested that alienation of those who go to or remain in a
foreign country to avoid the draft is justified by the war power.23 It seems
sufficient answer to point out that once expatriated, the citizen is no longer
subject to service in the armed forces, and that the country precludes all chance
of his services should he reform.
D. THE POWER TO PUNISH
Trop v. Dulles is the only case in which expatriation has been treated as a
punishment. Four Justices considered that the imposition of expatriation as a
punishment for desertion violated the eighth amendment.231 Justice Brennan,
concurring in the result, declared that expatriation was not a valid punishment.
The eighth amendment holding was probably meant to apply to all use
of expatriation as punishment - that is, that expatriation, per se, is an invalid
punishment. However, in future cases its precedential value may be limited
by three possible arguments. First, expatriation might not be cruel or unusual
as applied to crimes that show a transfer or lack of allegiance. Desertion to the
enemy, treason, sedition, or subversion might be such cases, though desertion
may only show cowardice, or, as in Trop, it may only be a technical matter.
(Trop was convicted as a deserter for breaking out of a stockade and attempting
to return to the fight.) A second possible reading of the opinion may be that
in Trop's case the violation was of such a minor nature that the penalty was
229 I.e., the danger that our troops in the field will be demoralized if they think that
deserters will "remain in the communion of our citizens."
230 See note 115 supra and accompanying.text.
231 Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas and Whittaker. The four dissenting
Justices did not consider expatriation to be a punishment in this case.
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too harsh; that a more flagrant violation would not be handled in the same
manner. This would be a misreading of the Chief Justice's opinion, however,
for it is quite clear that he was directing his remarks to the use of expatriation,
per se, as a punishment. Third, statelessness being a major burden, the rationale
might not apply to a dual national.
Justice Brennan's opinion is quite different. He spoke of expatriation only
as applied to desertion. He found that expatriation does not satisfy any of the
three functions of a punishment- deterrence, rehabilitation, or insulation of
the criminal from society. Rehabilitation will never be accomplished by ex-
patriation, he declared, since it is the very antithesis of rehabilitation, making
an outcast of the offender.
32
The determining fact in Justice Brennan's deciding that expatriation was not
a deterrent to desertion was that the penalties of death or long imprisonment were
prescribed for desertion in wartime. He was of the opinion that if these pos-
sibilities did iot deter desertion, expatriation would not.23 3 Two questions arise
concerning the future value of this position: 1) is it applicable to crimes for
which Congress could have established imprisonment or the death penalty, but
did not do so; and 2) how harsh must a penalty be in order to be considered
of such deterrent force that expatriation could add nothing.
1) Is the legislature or the adjudicating body given a free choice of punish-
ment? Could Congress impose expatriation as the sole penalty for desertion?
There would then be no argument that it was superfluous as a deterrent. Or
was Justice Brennan saying that before imposing expatriation, Congress must
use the usual battery of punishments available to it? If this was his notion,
it was not very different from holding expatriation to be a cruel and unusual
punishment, and invalid per se.
2) If Justice Brennan would permit Congress to impose expatriation as a
punishment in lieu of the death penalty or imprisonment, the question then
would arise whether in addition some imprisonment can be imposed. At what
point, then, does the deterrent effect of imprisonment make the deterrent effect
of expatriation superfluous? And why does not the deterrent effect of ex-
patriation make any imprisonment superfluous? These problems raise unanswer-
able questions. It must be conceded that Justice Brennan's opinion can only be
read logically as a refusal to allow expatriation as a punishment unless more
traditional punishments would not serve as effective deterrents. And, since im-
prisonment and the death penalty are available as traditional punishments,
expatriation may never be imposed. This is supported by his indication that
new punishments are valuable only if directed to constructive ends.23 4
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the dissenters in Trop, attacked the notion
that expatriation was cruel and unusual punishment (assuming, arguendo, that
it was punishment) on five grounds:
1) The death penalty for desertion is not cruel and unusual punishment,
232 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 111.
233 Id. at 112. It is not clear that existent penalties for desertion have been effective
deterrents; "during World War II as many as 21,000 soldiers were convicted of desertion
and sentenced to be dishonorably discharged." Ibid. n.8. Justice Brennan added that state-
lessness, since no one knows its ramifications, would probably not be an effective deterrent.-
234 Id. at 111.
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therefore expatriation - being less harsh than the death penalty - cannot be
cruel and unusual punishment."5 This position is untenable, for surely there
are punishments short of death that would be considered cruel and unusual.
The dissenters would probably not approve torture or mutilation, for example.
2) The opinion pointed out that "the seriousness of abandoning one's
country when it is in the grip of mortal conflict precludes denial to Congress
of the power to terminate citizenship here, unless that power is to be denied to
Congress under any circumstance." 236 As applied to the facts of the case, that
statement is too strong. But limited to the abstract notion that there is no more
serious crime than desertion in wartime, it is unexceptionable. And there is no
question that the Chief Justice's opinion strongly implies agreement.
3) There is historical basis for expatriation. "In this country, desertion
has been punishable by loss of at least the 'rights of citizenship' since 1865." '
The distinction is not insignificant, and is treated elsewhere.
4) If loss of citizenship may constitutionally be made the consequence
of such conduct as marrying a foreigner [Mackenzie v. Hare,
239 U.S. 299 (1915); Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491
(1950)], and thus certainly not "cruel and unusual," it seems more
than incongruous that such loss should be thought "cruel and un-
usual" when it is the consequence of conduct that is also a crime s.2 3
It is difficult to disagree with that statement. It is directed at only one of the
Justices, however. s9 Justice Brennan did not base his opinion on the eighth
amendment. Three of the Justices who did base their opinions on the eighth
amendment also disagreed with the interpretation of the Mackenzie and Savor-
gnan cases presented by Justice Frankfurter.240
5) Considering the expatriate as an alien vis--vis the United States, the
dissenters did not feel that his lot is at all bad so long as he is in the United
States; and that speculation as to his fate in other countries is not sufficient
justification for striking down the act.2 4' The implication of this position is that
Congress could constitutionally provide banishment as a punishment in general.
This position is directly opposite to that of the majority of the Court. There is no
rational basis for choosing one side or the other. What is involved is a matter
of personal evaluation. Even if one is of the opinion that this sort of evaluation
generally should be left to Congress, one must agree that there are limits on
Congress, and that the Court must decide when those limits are reached.242
The dissenters made no attempt to examine whether expatriation would
in fact be a workable punishment, as Justice Brennan did. Nor did they examine
235 356 U.S. at 125: "Is constitutional dialectic so empty of reason that it can be seri-
ously urged that loss of citizenship is a fate worse than death?"
236 Id. at 125-26.
237 Id. at 126. See pp. 4-5 supra.
238 Id. at 126.
239 Justice Whittaker, who agreed that expatriation violated the eighth amendment in
Trop, never registered his interpretation of the Mackenzie and Savorgnan cases. However, his
memorandum in Perez implied agreement with Justice Frankfurter's interpretation.
240 Compare Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. at 51-52, 61 (Frankfurter, J.), with id. at 69-73
(Warren, C. J., dissenting). In a concurring opinion in Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129,
139 (1958), Justices Black and Douglas stated that they would overrule Mackenzie and
Savorgnan if they were to be interpreted according to Justice Frankfurter's opinion.
241 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 127.
242 A thorough study of the problem may be found in the comment, The Expatriation
Act of 1954, 64 YALE L. J. 1164, 1189-99 (1955).
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whether the purposes of expatriation are consistent with punishment in general.
This is a reflection of their belief that citizenship is not a protected constitutional
right. It leads to the position that expatriation may be imposed as a punishment
for any crime. These problems are avoided when expatriation is defined, in such
circumstances, as disfranchisement.
E. PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS
Regardless of the reasons for the imposition of expatriation, the issue comes
before the courts in an action initiated by an individual who has been denied
a right of citizenship. The reason for the imposition of expatriation will, how-
ever, determine the nature and the scope of the judicial inquiry.
The reasons for the imposition 'of expatriation have generally been thought
to fall into two categories: punishment and regulation. This distinction has
been used to define procedural rights, and to determine the constitutional validity
of statutes in respect to the prohibitions against ex post facto laws, bills of
attainder, and cruel and unusual punishments. If expatriation is defined in
the particularistic fashion suggested in this article, that is, affecting only the
relevant right(s) of citizenship in each case, regulatory expatriation would
mean disfranchisement or the withdrawal of diplomatic protection; banishment
as a regulatory device should be considered a violation of due process. Penal
expatriation, if it meant anything,243 would mean banishment; banishment as
a punishment should be considered a violation of the eighth amendment. If,
instead of being defined as loss of the relevant right(s) of citizenship, expatria-
tion is defined as alienation or loss of nationality, the only relevant additional
aspect it takes on is banishment.
No procedural problems arise when the provision prescribing expatriation
is considered penal. The citizen is protected by the requirements for criminal
trials set forth in the Bill of Rights and is protected from cruel and unusual
punishments, bills of attainder, and ex post facto laws. When the citizen is
disfranchised upon conviction for a felony, he has had similar protection.2 4
Problems arise, however, when Congress seeks to deny rights of citizenship
using civil procedures.
The Supreme Court has ruled that in order for the government to ex-
patriate a citizen, it must prove by "clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence"
both that the alleged expatriating act was performed,245 and that it was per-
formed voluntarily.246 Congress has attempted to overrule these holdings by
243 Quaere whether either disfranchisement or withdrawal of diplomatic protection could
ever be imposed as punishment. Even if there is no insulative or rehabilitative effect, and an
insignificant deterrent effect, could not Congress express the moral disapproval of the com-
munity by withdrawing these rights? See note 171 supra.
244 Any sanction whose imposition as punishment would violate the eighth amendment
should be considered a violation of due process when imposed as regulation. A sanction that
would constitute a bill of attainder when penal should be considered a denial of equal pro-
tection when regulatory; The application of the sanction ex post facto is more troublesome.
The provision prescribing loss of nationality for voting in a foreign election was not effective
in expatriating those at whom it was aimed since it was believed to have prospective application
only. CODIFICATION OF THE NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, Pt. 1, at 67, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. (H.R. Comm. Print). Quaere whether this result was constitutionally required.
245 Gonzales v. Landon, 350 U.S. 920 (1955).
246 Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 139 (1958).
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providing that the alleged act need be proved by only a preponderance of the
evidence, and that there is a rebuttable presumption that the act was performed
voluntarily - rebuttable by a preponderance of the evidence.24 The Court has
not specifically stated that its decisions were constitutionally required. However,
they were certainly not based upon statutory direction. The concept of the
burden of clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence is one that comes from
suits in equity for cancellation of contracts on grounds of fraud or misrepresenta-
tion. It was carried over to cancellation of land grants, 4 and then to cancel-
lation of naturalization on the ground that the naturalization was gained fraudu-
lently.249 From that point, it was easy to say that denationalization should require
at least the same weight of evidence as denaturalization. There is no question
that Congress designed the Act of 1961 to overrule the Gonzales and
Nishikawa decisions.2 The Court will have to decide squarely on constitutional
grounds when the Act is challenged.
The constitutional decision will have implications beyond the issue of
burden of proof. At stake are all the procedural rights normally accorded the
defendant in a criminal trial. Should the trier of fact be permitted to draw
an unfavorable inference from the citizen's failure to testify?2. Or, if the
alleged expatriating act is also a criminal act, should the trier of fact be per-
mitted to draw an unfavorable inference from the citizen's refusal to answer
questions that might tend to incriminate him? Is the inference sufficiently strong
to satisfy the required weight of evidence?252 And may unlawfully seized evidence
be introduced over the objection of the citizen?252 Must he be confronted by
adverse witnesses?254 Is he entitled to a jury trial?255 Must the action be initiated
by indictment?25 And, if acquitted on an associated criminal charge, may he
be retried to impose expatriation?
2 5 7
There is precedent for treating these cases as "quasi-criminal," rather than
either as criminal or civil, as was done in the Gonzales and Nishikawa cases.22 8
Significantly, when legislating to overrule the Gonzales and Nishikawa cases,
Congress took care, at the advice of the Department of Justice, to make the
statute prospective.259
It is hoped that the Court will continue to apply procedural safeguards
247 Act of Sept. 26, 1961, 75 Stat. 656, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (c) (Supp. III 1962).
248 See Maxwell Land-Grant Case, 121 U.S. 325 (1887).
249 Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665 (1944); Schneiderman v. United States,
320 U.S. 118 (1943).
250 H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 40-41 (1961).
251 See Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476 (1893); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886).
252 See United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914).
253 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v.
Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923) (dictum). See also Note, Administrative Arrest Pending Depor-
tation Proceedings, 12 SYRACUSE L. REv. 184 (1960).
254 See United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475 (1896).
255 See Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909).
256 See Stockwell v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 531 (1871).
257 See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S.
436 (1886).
258 See cases cited notes 251-57 supra. These cases analyzed the quasi-criminal sanction
as calling for certain procedures, neither all criminal nor all civil, that were suited to the
particular statute. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 400 n.3, 404 n.12 (1938), put a
damper on this developing trend.
259 H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 40-41 (1961).
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where appropriate- as in Gonzales and Nishikawa -rather than according
to artificial classifications. Consistent with this development would be the
practice of dealing with expatriation itself on a less abstract basis, fashioning
the procedural safeguards to accord with the true nature of the specific sub-
stantive right(s) being challenged.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is concluded that expatriation, if taken to mean literally loss of citizen-
ship (alienation), is unconstitutional. The power to take away a person's citizen-
ship is not expressly granted to the federal government; it was considered an
inherent power of the government neither at the time the Constitution was
ratified, nor at the time the fourteenth amendment took effect. Nevertheless,
the power to withdraw citizenship might be thought to have become an attribute
of the federal government if it were a necessary power. But unless the power to
banish a citizen is necessary for the proper and effective exercise of its sovereign
duties, the federal government cannot be said to have the power to withdraw
one's citizenship against his will, because banishment is the only significant aspect
added to expatriation by interpreting it as alienation (loss of citizenship) rather
than as loss of the rights of citizenship. It is the concept of banishment that
should concern the courts in their determinations of the constitutionality of
expatriation.
Where possible, the courts should interpret the statutes as withdrawing
only other rights of citizenship -the political franchise and diplomatic pro-
tection. This interpretation has both historical and theoretical justification. It is
in harmony with the practical needs of the government, and, at the same time,
the citizen is not deprived of rights that are wholly irrelevant to the problem
created by his conduct.
APPENDIX. I
EXPATRIATION STATUTES
8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1958), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(c) (Supp. III,
1962), 66 Stat. 267 (1952), as amended:
(a) From and after the effective date of this chapter a person who
is a national of the United States whether by birth or naturalization,
shall lose his nationality by -
(1) obtaining naturalization in a foreign state upon his- own
application, upon an application 'filed in his behalf by a parent,
guardian, or duly authorized agent, or through the naturaliza-
tion of a parent having legal custody of such person: Provided,
That nationality shall not be lost by any person under this sec-
tion as the result of the naturalization of a parent or parents
while such person is under the age of twenty-one years, or as the
result of a naturalization obtained on behalf of a person under
twenty-one years of age by a parent, guardian, or duly author-
ized agent, unless such person shall fail to enter the United
States to establish a permanent residence prior to his twenty-
fifth birthday: And provided further, That a person who shall
have lost nationality prior to January 1, 1948, through the nat-
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uralization in a foreign state of a parent or parents, may, within
one year from the effective date of this chapter, apply for a visa
and for admission to the United States as a nonquota immi-
grant under the provisions of section 1101 (a) (27) (E) of this
title; or
(2) taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal
declaration of allegiance to a foreign state or a political sub-
division thereof; or
(3) entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state
unless, prior to such entry or service, such entry or service is
specifically authorized in writing by the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Defense: Provided, That the entry into such
service by a person prior to the attainment of his eighteenth
birthday shall serve to expatriate such person only if there exists
an option to secure a release from such service and such person
fails to exercise such option at the attainment of his eighteenth
birthday; or
(4) (A) accepting, serving in, or performing the duties of any
office, post, or employment under the government of a foreign
state or a political subdivision thereof, if he has or acquires
the nationality of such foreign state; or (B) accepting, serving
in, or performing the duties of any office, post, or employment
under the government of a foreign state or a political subdivision
thereof, for which office, post, or employment an oath, affirma-
tion, or declaration of allegiance is required; or
(5) voting in a political election in a foreign state or participat-
ing in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over
foreign territory; or
(6) making a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplo-
matic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state,
in such form as may be prescribed by the Secretary of State; or
(7) making in the United States a formal written renunciation
of nationality in such form as may be prescribed by, and before
such officer as may be designated by, the Attorney General,
whenever the United States shall be in a state of war and the
Attorney General shall approve such renunciation as not con-
trary to the interests of national defense; or
(8) deserting the military, air, or naval forces of the United
States in time of war, if and when he is convicted thereof by
court-martial and as the result of such conviction is dismissed or
dishonorably discharged from the service of such military, air,
or naval forces: Provided, That notwithstanding loss of nation-
ality or citizenship under the terms of this chapter or previous
laws by reason of desertion committed in time of war, restora-
tion to active duty with such military, air, or naval forces in time
of war or the reenlistment or induction of such a person in
time of war with permission of competent military, air, or naval
authority shall be deemed to have the immediate effect of restor-
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ing such nationality or citizenship heretofore or hereafter so
lost; or
(9) committing any act of treason against, or attempting by
force to overthrow, or bearing arms against, the United States,
violating or conspiring to violate any of the provisions of section
2383 of Title 18 or willfully performing any act in violation of
section 2385 of Title 18, or violating section 2384 of Title 18 by
engaging in a conspiracy to overthrow, put down, or to destroy
by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war
against them, if and when he is convicted thereof by a court-
martial or by a court of competent jurisdiction; or
(10) departing from or remaining outside of the jurisdiction of
the United States in time of war or during a period declared by
the President to be a period of national emergency for the pur-
pose of evading or avoiding training and service in the military,
air, or naval forces of the United States. For the purposes of
this paragraph failure to comply with any provision of any com-
pulsory service laws of the United States shall raise the presump-
tion -that the departure from or absence from the United States
was for the purpose of evading or avoiding training and service
in the military, air, or naval forces of the United States.
(b) Any person who commits or performs any act specified in sub-
section (a) of this section shall be conclusively presumed to have done
so voluntarily and without having been subjected to duress of any
kind, if such person at the time of the act was a national of the state
in which the act was performed and had been physically present in
such state for a period or periods totaling ten years or more
immediately prior to such act.
(c) Whenever the loss of United States nationality is put in issue in
any action or proceeding commenced on or after September 26, 1961
under, or by virtue of, the provisions of this or any other Act, the
burden shall be upon the person or party claiming that such loss oc-
curred, to establish such claim by a preponderance of the evidence.
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, any
person who commits or performs, or who has committed or per-
formed, any act of expatriation under the provisions of this chapter
or any other Act shall be presumed to have done so voluntarily, but
such presumption may be rebutted upon a showing, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that -the act or acts committed or performed
were not done voluntarily.
8 U.S.C. § 1482 (1958), 66 Stat. 269 (1952):
A person who acquired at birth the nationality of the United States
and of a foreign state and who has voluntarily sought or claimed
benefits of the nationality of any foreign state shall lose his United
States nationality by hereafter having a continuous residence for
three years in the foreign state of which he is a national by birth at
any time after attaining the age of -twenty-two years unless he
shall
(1) prior to the expiration of such three-year period, take an
oath of allegiance to the United States before a United States
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displomatic [sic] or consular officer in a manner prescribed by
the Secretary of State; and
(2) have his residence outside of the United States solely for one
of the reasons set forth in paragraphs (1), (2)-(7), or
(8) of section 1485 of this title, or paragraph (1) or (2) of sec-
tion 1486 of this tile: Provided, however, That nothing con-
tained in this section shall deprive any person of his United
States nationality if his foreign residence shall begin after he
shall have attained the age of sixty years and shall have had his
residence in the United States for twenty-five years after having
attained the age of eighteen years.
8 U.S.C. § 1484 (1958), 66 Stat. 269 (1952):
(a) A person who has become a national by naturalization shall
lose his nationality by
(1) having a continuous residence for three years in the territory
of a foreign state of which he was formerly a national or in
which the place of his birth is situated, except as provided in
section 1485 of this title, whether such residence commenced be-
fore or after the effective date of this chapter;
(2) having a continuous residence for five years in any other
foreign state or states, except as provided in sections 1485 and
1486 of this title, whether such residence commenced before or
after the effective date of this chapter.
(b) (1) For the purpose of paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of
this section, the time during which the person had his residence
abroad solely or principally for a reason or purpose within the
scope of any provision of section 1485 of this title shall not be
counted in computing quantum of residence.
(2) For the purpose of paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of this
section, the time during which the person had his residence
abroad solely or principally for a reason or purpose within the
scope of any provision of sections 1485 and 1486 of this title
shall not be counted in computing quantum of residence.
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